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INTRODUCTION
This paper begins from the observation of what seems an
odd phenomenon: the role of lawyer is widely understood by law
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students and practitioners as the entry into a simplified ethical
world, one in which ordinary moral principles are cleared away
by the hegemony of doctrines unique to the practice of law. Tak-
ing on the special obligations of the lawyer is not thought to add
to one's moral burdens, but, paradoxically, to render large parts
of the role morally simple, or even amoral. As we are not the first
to notice, these understandings are supported by and may origi-
nate in a particular view of lawyers' professional responsibility-
view in which a lawyer's ethical obligations as a professional are
defined largely (though not entirely) by specialized legal rules
(principally the codes of ethics and other rules that regulate law-
yer conduct) and the policies thought to underlie those rules.
Like drivers on the road who must contend with duties imposed
by the law of torts, or like businessmen whose transactions must
take account of the law of contracts, lawyers in their everyday
work must comply with what some call the "law of lawyering."
There is nothing natural or even intuitive about defining
lawyers' ethical obligations primarily in terms of compliance with
rules. Indeed, there has long been a debate about whether black
letter codifications can possibly serve as an adequate platform for
ethical deliberation.1 But to acknowledge this debate is not to
argue that there is some alternative way of thinking about law-
yers' professional responsibility that is truly or actually natural.
All "fields" of law must be constructed somehow.2 What is worth
consideration is how a field is constructed in one way rather than
another, and the effects of any given construction.
Our thesis embraces two claims. The first claim is that
within the traditional law school curriculum, law is constructed as
a relatively autonomous "discipline" distinguished from other
disciplines, including philosophical ethics, and that the disci-
pline of law is subdivided into relatively separate "fields." Thus,
notwithstanding more than a century of developments in legal
education and claims of "progress" in our understanding of
law-notwithstanding the academy's apparent absorption of
influences ranging from legal realism to critical legal studies to
1. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules ?, 59
TEx. L. REV. 639 (1981); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers
Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 885, 900-07 (1996); Tanina Ros-
tan, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1273 (1998).
2. The "field" of property, for example, was once constructed almost
entirely around the English common law system of estates in land, but it is less
so today, whenever less wealth is held in the form of real property. SeeJohn H.
Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988). See alsoJoseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611 (1988).
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feminist jurisprudence to critical race theory to a host of "law
and" analyses-students continue to be educated into a relatively
Langdellian world view.3 The second claim is that within the
traditional law school curriculum, professional responsibility is
constructed as its own field of law-a reality perfectly captured in
the title of one of the leading professional responsibility
casebooks: Cases and Materials on the Law Governing Lawyers.4 As a
consequence, law students learn to think of law, generally, and
professional responsibility, specifically, as disengaged from moral
considerations.
Our observations about these issues come from outside the
field. Neither of us teaches professional responsibility,5 nor have
we heretofore produced scholarship addressing issues of profes-
sional responsibility. Accordingly, we take no position on the
many important debates within the field about lawyers' particular
ethical responsibilities. As outsiders, we are interested in how
the field appears to be constructed and what strikes us as some of
the implications of that construction.
As outsiders we are also well aware that we are not the first to
observe the uneasy relationship between ethics and the field of
professional responsibility. Countless scholars, attorneys, teach-
ers, and students have wrestled with the question of how the
parameters of the lawyer's role should be understood in light of
ordinary morality. Our contribution to this ongoing debate, we
hope, is to describe how the "legalistic" construction of profes-
sional responsibility has been systematically built into the typical
law school curriculum. So powerful is this construction that
important attempts to teach against it have marginal effect, and
casebooks in the field that challenge the construction are rarely
used. Indeed, such is the hegemony of this construction that its
most basic component-the separation of the field of profes-
sional responsibility from ethics-is reinforced by even the most
thoughtful and influential dissident voices in the scholarship of
the field.
3. For a succinct statement of Langdell's view of law as a science, see
CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS V-
vii (1871), reprinted in READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFES-
SION 216-17 (Dennis R. Nolan ed., 1980); Christopher C. Langdell, Teaching
Law as a Science, 21 AM. L. REv. 123 (1887). See generally Thomas C. Grey, Modem
American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L. J. 493 (1996) (book review); Thomas C.
Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 1 (1983).
4. J A Es E. MOUTERNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW GOVERNING
LAwvRs (2000).
5. We do co-teach a law school course, Ethical Perspectives on the Prac-
tice of Law, which touches on many of the issues raised in this essay.
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Part I of this paper takes up the question of how the profes-
sional responsibility field has been traditionally structured in the
law school curriculum, exploring the ways in which professional
responsibility has been constructed on a "legalistic" model, i.e.,
as but another field of law. This model teaches students to view
professional ethics as a body of rules, doctrines, and principles
promulgated by authoritative institutions and to view an analysis
of issues within this field as an application of methods of legal
reasoning, understood to be distinct from the ordinary modes of
moral reasoning. This curricular construction responds to a vari-
ety of pressures ranging from more general beliefs about the
nature of law, to the law schools' perceived responsibility to help
students pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examina-
tion, to students' expectations about what they should be learn-
ing in a professional school. The overall effect of the legalistic
model is to inculcate what we call a "pothole" conception of eth-
ics, in which ethical issues are understood as "problems" and
"dilemmas" which lie along the otherwise morally smooth road of
legal practice and which the attentive lawyer can anticipate and
either avoid or safely negotiate.
In Part II we point out that there is nothing about the con-
cept of law that requires its separation from ordinary moral rea-
soning. Law could be (and has been) understood instead to be
inextricably tied to morality. We suggest that when law is con-
structed so as to be saturated with moral concerns, then the pro-
fessional work of lawyers and, hence, their professional
responsibilities, can be understood to be similarly saturated. We
do this by examining the routine tasks of lawyering: decisions as
to whether and how to litigate a particular case, the framing of
legal issues, the presentation of facts, interpretive judgments
about the meaning of legal doctrine, and what application to par-
ticular facts. These tasks are often presented in legal education
as matters of craft and strategy, but, we argue, they can be seen as
suffused with moral significance. We do not argue that law must
or even should be seen as suffused with moral significance, only
that it can be. Our point is that this alternative view of the possi-
ble connection between law and morality might suggest a very
different vision of the field of professional responsibility.
In Part III we explore some of what is at stake in our deci-
sions about how to construct professional responsibility. We
begin by observing that the traditional law school construction,
with its separation of professional responsibility doctrine from
ordinary moral principles, has a powerful allure for law students
and practitioners, and we examine the basis for that allure and its
remarkable resiliency in the face of repeated, multidimensional
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assaults on the legalistic model. We then turn to a curious fact
about the Langdellian model of law as a separate, distinct, and
even autonomous field: it seems to define not only the tradi-
tional legalistic model of professional responsibility, but some of
the most important alternatives to that model that have emerged
in recent decades. Accordingly, we examine what kind of under-
standing of ourselves as lawyers is built into the general idea of
constructing professional responsibility as a field of law, and we
ask what kind of self-understanding might flow from constructing
professional responsibility instead as an expression of ordinary
morality.
We want to emphasize that this essay offers no new alterna-
tive model on which to construct professional responsibility. Our
concern is to describe how the traditional, dominant model is
systematically expressed in the law school curriculum, generally,
and in the professional responsibility curriculum, specifically,
and to explore some of the implications of the model's hegem-
ony. At the same time, we do not regard this essay as simply an
academic exercise, and we readily acknowledge the strong criti-
cism of the traditional construction implied in the discussion
that follows, a point to which we will return in the Conclusion.
I. THE LAw SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Construction of Law in the Law School Curriculum
When we say that professional responsibility is constructed
as a "field of law," we mean this initially6 in the sense that con-
tracts, torts, property, and so forth are constructed as fields of law
within the law school curriculum. For reasons that we will discuss
below, there are substantial pressures to make professional
responsibility look like other law school courses and, hence, to
make the "field" of professional responsibility look like other
"fields" included in the curriculum.7 It is important, therefore,
to be clear about how a legal field is typically constructed in law
school, especially in the first year, when students' understanding
of law is most acutely shaped.
The salient characteristic of law's construction in the acad-
emy is its disciplinary separateness. That is, law is understood to
be a discrete discipline, an area of study distinct from, say, sociol-
6. See discussion infta Part IIIB.
7. See discussion infra Part IIIA.
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ogy, literature, economics, or political science.' This is not to
deny the potential significance of these other disciplines for legal
thought. Indeed, principally under the lingering influence of
Legal Realism, the relevance of extra-legal disciplines, perhaps
most notably economics, is widely acknowledged within the acad-
emy. Nonetheless, and this is crucial, these influences are typi-
cally understood as distinct from law itself.
An important aspect of this disciplinary separateness is the
claim that law involves a distinctive way of reasoning about legal
issues: "thinking like a lawyer." Indeed, among the powerful
tools in the construction of law as an autonomous discipline is
the idea that law demands a distinctive way of thinking, one that
is different from ordinary reasoning.9 And one of the principal
ways in which it is different from ordinary reasoning is its banish-
ment of sentiment, emotion, and ordinary moral consideration
from the analysis of legal doctrine and the application of doc-
trine to concrete legal disputes (legal disputes being a distinct
species of dispute). Notwithstanding relentless criticism from
sectors of the academy,10 students are typically discouraged from
8. For a discussion of the construction of law as a discipline in the context
of the law-and-literature movement, see Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the
Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J. 1059 (1999).
9. As Professor Kingsfield put it in the film The Paper Chase, "You come
here with minds full of mush-and leave thinking like a lawyer." THE PAPER
CHASE (20th Century Fox 1973); see a/soJoHN JAY OSBORN, JR., THE PAPER CHASE
17-21 (1971). Or, as one of us was told on the first day of law school, "Cherish
this moment! It is the last time you will think like a human being."
This feature of the law school construction of law has a significant ideologi-
cal overlay. The "objective" and "neutral" Rule of Law contrasts with rules in
accordance with the personal and subjective wishes of the powerful. See generally
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L.J. 1 (1984). Hence, because sentiment, emotion, and moral considera-
tion are deemed to reflect personal and subjective interests and preferences,
their relationship to legal reasoning is highly problematic. For arguments that
"legal reasoning" is a unique and distinctive form of thinking, the elements of
which can be taught and learned, see STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION To
LAw AND LEGAL REASONING (2d ed. 1995); RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN
COMMON LAw METHOD (1997); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LInE A LAW-
YER: AN INTRODUCrION TO LEGAL REASONING (1996).
Of course, as with all aspects of the law school construction, there are dis-
senters. See, e.g., infra note 10. Moreover, Western legal thought includes
important constructions of law-natural law theory, and the Jewish and Islamic
legal traditions stand out as examples-that link law inextricably to morality.
10. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER& ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLI-
ENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994); Roger I. Abrams, The Dance and the
Adjudication of Disputes, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 901 (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714
(1994); Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Law-
yer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259 (1999).
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expressing emotional discomfort with a line of analysis or from
criticizing a decision on the grounds that it is simply immoral.
The separateness of law extends to the individual doctrinal
areas that constitute the study of law. Notwithstanding experi-
ments aimed at breaking down the borders separating Langdell's
doctrinal divisions,11 torts, contracts, and property are typically
constructed in the law school curriculum as distinct fields, each
with its own terminology, mode of analysis, and logical separa-
tion from other fields.12 Thus, part of the rigor of legal inquiry
involves breaking down the genus of law into sharply differenti-
ated species, which are then treated as natural kinds.1"
What are entering law students taught about the moral
dimensions of their professional work? If we examine the stan-
dard first-year curriculum, we find an array of doctrinally ori-
ented courses (typically torts, contracts, property, constitutional
law, criminal law, and civil procedure), a course in legal research
and writing, and perhaps one in legal methods. We find nothing
in the standard first-year curriculum that takes justice or ethics as
its specific subject matter.
In the doctrinal courses, students are exposed, primarily
through the study of cases and statutes, to the concepts that
define the field. In contracts, for instance, they learn the
requirements for contract formation, the affirmative defenses
that can be raised to escape contractual obligations, and the rem-
edies available for breach. Initially, these concepts are perceived
as bits of information to be learned and memorized, and the
techniques of case analysis and statutory interpretation that are
practiced along the way are seen as tools for ferreting out these
pieces of doctrine.
However, in time, students come to understand that the law-
yer's job is not to mechanically apply doctrine to facts and crank
11. The experimental curriculum of CUNY Law School and the alterna-
tive first-year curriculum at Harvard are examples. On the CUNY curriculum,
see Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lauyering as
Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L.
Rev. 1157 (1990); on the Harvard curriculum, see Todd D. Rakoff, The Harvard
First-Year Experiment, 39 J. Legal Educ. 491 (1989). See alsoJay Feinman & Marc
Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 900-25 (1985) (discussing their
course in Contorts).
12. See, e.g., Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892)
(rejecting a contract characterization in favor of a tort characterization); Haum-
schild v. Continental Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (rejecting a tort character-
ization in favor of a family law characterization).
13. Consequently, the infiltration of analysis characteristic of another
doctrinal field-for example, the replacement of a property analysis of land-
lord-tenant relationships with a contract analysis-tends to be slow.
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out the correct answers. They learn that the holdings of cases
can be read narrowly or broadly; that by focusing on different
aspects of two cases, they can analogize or distinguish them; and
that a series of cases can be synthesized in different ways. They
learn that a statutory text can be interpreted in accordance with
its plain meaning or purpose or with the intent of its framers,
and that this variety of interpretive approaches can be further
complicated by irresolvable disagreements over what constitutes
the plain meaning or the legislative intent or the statute's pur-
pose. And from this process, students come eventually to see
that legal doctrine is not a compilation of bits of information to
be learned and memorized, but malleable concepts character-
ized by a significant degree of vagueness and open texture.
14
With this insight comes power. Once the student of contract
law sees that the doctrine of consideration has a lot of play in the
joints, she understands that in many cases it will be possible for a
lawyer to argue either that there is or is not legally adequate con-
sideration. Once the student of criminal law understands that
the doctrines of insanity, involuntariness, and provocation over-
lap, she understands that in many cases it will be possible for a
lawyer to frame a defense in a variety of ways.15
But the power is not unlimited. Students learn that they
cannot argue anything they want. Within a doctrinal area, legal
argumentation is constrained by the policies that are convention-
ally understood to inform the field. Fault and compensation in
torts; freedom of contract, reliance, and fair dealing in contract
14. On the concept of open texture, see infra text accompanying note 98.
15. Through the legal research and writing course, the first-year student
will also learn that factual descriptions of cases are similarly malleable. Specifi-
cally, she develops the skill of crafting a "Statement of the Case" in briefs that
will set the stage for the chosen issue formulation and supporting legal argu-
ments. Student attitudes toward the development of these manipulative skills
vary. Some students understand themselves to be mastering a powerful esoteric
logic called "legal reasoning." Others will understand themselves to be master-
ing the moves of an elaborate game. Many who share the view that there is a
distinctly "legal" form of reasoning have argued that the techniques of such
reasoning have a structured or patterned quality, in which arguments can be,
and often are, paired in ways that, in effect, cancel each other out, rather than
leading to single correct answers. For examples of such skeptical approaches,
see PIERRE SCHLAG & DAVID SKOVER, TAcrics OF LEGAL REASONING (1986);James
Boyle, A Symposium of Critical Legal Studies: The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U.
L. REv. 1003, 1051-60 (1985); Laura E. Little, Characterization and Legal Discourse,
46J. LEGAL EDUC. 372, 383-92 (1996);Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics,
69 TEX. L. REV. 1779, 1786 (1991). For a legal realist version of this point in
connection with statutory construction, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950).
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law; retribution and utility in criminal law; efficiency, accuracy,
and fairness in procedure-each of these sets of values forms a
matrix within which issues are framed and doctrinal arguments
made and which determines the persuasiveness of these framings
and arguments.1 6 For example, there will be many contract cases
in which the lawyer cannot plausibly argue that consideration is
lacking.
17
Where in all this learning is instruction in the ethical dimen-
sions of the lawyer's role? In an important sense, it is everywhere
in the first-year curriculum but as an absence. That is, most of
the curriculum is instruction as to what the practicing lawyer is
not morally accountable for. And the instruction is almost never
explicit.
To the extent that students perceive doctrine to have a
moral dimension, they understand that moral dimension to
reside in the creation of law by legislatures, courts, administrative
agencies, and constitutional conventions. It is, for instance, of
considerable moral significance whether a product manufacturer
can be held liable for injuries caused in the absence of fault. It is
a similarly great moral question whether a signatory to a contract
can escape the accepted obligations on the grounds that the
terms are unconscionable. But the value judgments reflected in
these doctrines are made by legislators, including common law
judges. Law students learn from the outset that as advocates,
they are not accountable for the moral choices reflected in the
contours of legal doctrine. They learn this through the persis-
tent presentation of doctrine as emanating from sources external
to the lawyer-from cases, statutes, regulations, and constitu-
tional provisions. In this model of law, morality may affect the
decisions that lead to law's creation, but it is largely irrelevant to
disputes about what the current state of the law is and how it
applies to specific cases. Judges, legislators, administrators, and
constitutional framers are responsible for creating doctrine.
They make the law; lawyers only make arguments.
Of course policy-so much a part of standard legal analy-
sis-can be understood to raise dramatic moral issues. 8 Policies
16. See generally Richard K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal Argument: The
Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 855 (1987).
17. Whether this limitation is an intrinsic property of law or is the prod-
uct of institutional or external forces has been widely debated. See, e.g., J.M.
Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. Rv. 1133 (1991) (reviewing ANDREW
ALTMAN, CRITIcAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)); Singer, supra
note 9, at 19-25. See generally, Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudi-
cation: A Critical Phenomenology, 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
18. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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concern the purposes and consequences of particular legal doc-
trines, and the relationships among consequentialist analysis,
morality, and law have long been identified and explored.19
Indeed, the policies that inform the various doctrinal fields-
autonomy, retribution, fair dealing, efficiency, fault-based liabil-
ity, compensation, and so forth-reflect important considera-
tions of social justice that are continually in play among the cases
studied in first-year courses. It is not uncommon for these values
to be identified and discussed in the law school classroom. Stu-
dents might be encouraged, for instance, to debate whether the
law of torts ought to recognize some kind of an affirmative duty
to rescue other members of the community who are in danger.
But law school pedagogy distinguishes between such conversa-
tions about the wisdom of policies and the lawyer's craft in mak-
ing any of a number of competing policy arguments, depending
on what is required to further the interests of the client. Like
doctrine, policies are presented as external to the lawyer. The
lawyer finds policies in the opinions of judges, in legislative his-
tory, in statutory preambles, and in the public and private writ-
ings of the Constitution's framers. Lawyers make use of
policies-lawyers might even propose new policies-but the
responsibility for choosing among competing policies, lawyers
are taught, is once again that of law makers. In sum, for the law
student, policies are not expressions of moral considerations, but
additional weapons in the strategic armory available to the lawyer
to further the client's goals.
And what about the "play in the joints"? Might not the
power to frame the issue, to construe the doctrine, to present the
facts, or to apply law to facts in this way or that,-might not this
power entail an ineradicable moral dimension and consequently
an unavoidable moral responsibility on the part of the lawyer? It
might.2 ° But that is not what first-year law students are taught.
The relentless practice of argumentation skills throughout that
initial year is justified in terms of craft, and the choices to be
made regarding the content of arguments are governed largely
by strategic concerns, that is, concerns that center on advancing
the client's interests. In classroom interactions, whether the stu-
dent argues for the prevailing conceptions or for a change in the
law; whether she frames the issue narrowly or broadly; whether
she argues for a statute's plain meaning or for an interpretation
that will carry out its putative purpose; whether she analogizes or
19. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789).
20. See discussion infra Part II.
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distinguishes a particular precedent-all these choices, she
comes to understand, turn on two considerations: what can be
plausibly maintained and what will serve the client's interests and
goals. Rarely, if ever, are these choices explicitly recognized by
teacher or student to express moral decisions for which the law-
yer is accountable.
This silence reinforces the instrumentalist conception of the
lawyer's role that law students have already absorbed from the
larger culture. This is the conception of the lawyer as the client's
hired gun, champion, gladiator, and paladin. This instrumental-
ist conception-often dubbed the "standard conception" 2 1-
comprises the notion of lawyer neutrality (the lawyer does not
judge the client's goals) and partisanship (the lawyer uses all of
his craft to further those goals within the bounds of the law,
including the law of professional responsibility).2
An important corollary of the neutral partisanship concep-
tion is moral nonaccountability.2" Insofar as he uses his craft to
further the goals of the client, the lawyer is not accountable if
those goals lack moral worthiness (measured by ordinary moral-
ity), and insofar as his use of his craft is lawful, he is not account-
able if the means lack moral worthiness (again, measured by
ordinary morality). As we will see in Part III, part of the allure of
constructing law as a distinct, bounded field, separate from other
disciplines, including philosophical ethics, is its apparent ability
to shore up this assertion of moral nonaccountability.24
B. The Construction of Professional Responsibility as a Field of Law
What, then, does the first-year law student take to be the sub-
ject matter of legal ethics? To the extent that the course work or
hallway conversation involves any discussion of a lawyer's ethical
obligations, it most likely amounts to unsystematic references to
various ethical problems that a lawyer might encounter-
problems involving matters, such as keeping client confidences
and avoiding conflicts of interest. These problems have little to
do with what the student has come to see as the lawyer's core
work: analyzing cases, interpreting statutes, framing issues,
organizing facts, and making arguments. They have everything
21. See DAVID LutAN, LAWYERs AND JusTicE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 393-403
(1988); see also Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55
N.Y.U. L. REv. 63, 73 (1980), reprinted in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 158,
165 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1986) [hereinafter ETHics].
22. For an extensive analysis of the important role that the standard con-
ception actually plays, see LuBAN, supra note 21, at 393-403.
23. See id. at 154-56.
24. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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to do with discrete problems arising out of specific relationships
between the lawyer and others: the lawyer and the client, the law-
yer and a tribunal, the lawyer and third parties. In sum, the
depiction of the moral landscape in legal practice shows that
practice to be largely unencumbered by ethical concerns, but for
occasional potholes in the road-danger areas that the conscien-
tious and attentive lawyer should either avoid altogether or navi-
gate through carefully and safely.
To accomplish this safe navigation, the first-year student is
assured that she will draw on the same skills applicable to the
competent mastery of doctrine. What any student is likely to
hear early and often is the responsibility of the lawyer to zeal-
ously represent the client "within the bounds of the law." 25 Per-
haps only dimly at first, the student comes to understand that the
"bounds of the law" not only refers to the law of crimes, torts,
and contracts, but also to the law of legal ethics. A perusal of the
curriculum reveals that there is a course that addresses that law.
Like torts, contracts, property, and the like, professional respon-
sibility is treated as a body of doctrine to be specially studied and
mastered-in this case through an upper-level course.
To construct professional responsibility as law in the way
that law is generally constructed in the law school curriculum
means constructing it as an autonomous field-one that is
sharply distinguished from other subjects in the curriculum and
from other "extra-legal" fields such as philosophy, economics,
and sociology, and one in which problems are subjected to a rea-
soning process that excludes sentiment, emotion, and moral con-
sideration. Now, the idea that moral considerations should be
regarded as extraneous to the field of professional responsibility
25. This language was included in Canon 15 of the A.B.A. Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, adopted in 1908:
In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land,
and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the
lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the
law.
The Canons were superseded in 1969 by the A.B.A. Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 7 of which holds that "[a] lawyer should represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law." The language does not appear in the
mandatory provisions of the A.B.A.'s 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, in
the "Comment" on Rule 1.3 (Diligence), the Model Rules state that the lawyer:
May take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindi-
cate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commit-
ment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to
press for every advantage that might be realized for a client.
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might seem counterintuitive. After all, "Legal Ethics" is an occa-
sionally used alternative name for this particular curricular offer-
ing. But the construction of the doctrinal field of legal ethics
must be viewed in the context of the overall construction of law.
Law, as we have seen, is constructed in the curriculum as positive
law, as law emanating from an authoritative, political source.
Accordingly, professional ethics as a field is constructed as posi-
tive legal doctrine emanating from authoritative, political
sources, principally bar associations and courts. Notwithstanding
powerful dissenting voices,26 ethics in the more common sense of
moral philosophy is treated as a different kind of matter in the
standard construction of the field-different because morality is
presented as personal and subjective and thus not properly a part
of any field of law, including the law of professional
responsibility.
This dichotomy is nicely captured by William Simon:
There are two prevailing conceptions of legal ethics or
professJonal responsibility. The first conflates legal ethics
with the disciplinary rules of the codes-rules promulgated
under state-delegated authority and enforced by punitive
sanctions. Under this conception, the subject might better
be called "Regulation of Lawyers," a name in fact used by
one of the legal ethics textbooks, in the same way that the
study of the rules governing the practice of transportation
companies is called "Regulation of Common Carriers."
The second conception conflates legal ethics with the pri-
vate or personal moralities of individual lawyers. Here the
core concerns are the constraints of role on self-expression
and the legitimacy of requiring the individual lawyer to
perform actions in role that conflict with her personal
values.
The disciplinary rule conception is the dominant one
among lawyers and law teachers. Most law school courses
and bar association discussions of legal ethics are devoted
largely to such rules. The professional responsibility com-
ponent of bar exams consists entirely of a test of such rules.
The personal morality conception is the dominant one
among philosophers and psychologists concerned with
lawyering, and it has influenced a minority of law teachers
and practitioners as well, including most of those with the
more original and ambitious approaches to legal ethics.
26. See LuBAN, supra note 21; Posterna, supra note 21; Richard Wasser-
strom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HumAN RIGHTs Q. 105-28
(1975), reprinted in ETHics, supra note 21, at 114-31.
50 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15
These people try to help lawyers become more self-con-
scious and articulate about their personal values and to
provide some psychological support for such values against
the pressures of role.
27
As Simon goes on to observe, the Model Rules, which form the
doctrinal skeleton for most, if not all, professional responsibility
courses, draws from each of these conceptions:
On the one hand, there are norms designed for discipli-
nary enforcement prohibiting specified conduct.
Although the drafters of the Model Rules describe these
norms as "rules of reason," most of them in fact have a
rigid, categorical character that leaves little room for judg-
ment, and in fact these norms were designed, as one
drafter put it, "to provide a black letter rule for every case."
On the other hand, we find a set of norms that effectively
grant broad, unreviewable autonomy to lawyers to consult
their personal values. These norms are typically conten-
tless; they make no effort to suggest how the decisions that
fall under them might be made other than in terms of the
lawyer's subjective predispositions.
28
An example of Simon's point is the Model Rules' provision
regarding termination of representation. On the one hand, Rule
1.16 lists three specific instances in which the lawyer is required
to withdraw from representation: when the representation will
result in violation of the law, when "the lawyer's physical or
mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to
represent the client, or when the client discharges the attor-
ney." 9 By contrast, the lawyer is permitted to withdraw when "a
client insists on pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant . . . ., The latter provision is noteworthy both
because of its permissive, rather than mandatory character (no
sanctions attach to the lawyer's decision in this regard), and
because the question of repugnance is dependent on what "the
lawyer considers" to be the case-that is, repugnance is a matter
of the lawyer's personal sensibilities, not an ethical quality of the
client's objective.
This law-morality dichotomy plays an important structural
role within the Model Rules. The "Preamble" identifies a number
of criss-crossing ethical obligations: obligations to the client, to
27. William H. Simon, The Trouble With Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65,
65-66 (1991) (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 67 (citations omitted).
29. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.16(a)(1)-(3) (1983).
30. Id. Rule 1.16(b) (3).
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legal institutions, to third parties, and to the public. It goes on to
recognize that it is in the "nature of law practice" that:
[C]onflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually
all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and
to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright per-
son while earning a satisfactory living .... 31
But an examination of the rules reveals that these "conflicting
responsibilities" do not all take place within the law. Rule 2.1
provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise indepen-
dent professional judgment and render candid advice. In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation.
2
This language indicates two things: first, that reference to
"moral" factors is distinguished from references to the "law"; sec-
ond, that the rendering of moral advice is permissive, rather than
mandatory. These points are both elaborated in the "Comment"
that follows the Rule:
[2] Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little
value to a client, especially where practical considerations,
such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant.
Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be
inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant
moral and ethical considerations in giving advice.
Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and
ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions
and may decisively influence how the law will be applied. 3
This distinction between authoritatively promulgated
mandatory rules of conduct and personal, subjective morality is
reflected in the National Conference of Bar Examiners' charac-
terization of its Multistate Professional Responsibility Examina-
tion (M.P.R.E.). The Conference describes the M.P.R.E. as:
[B]ased on the law governing the conduct of lawyers,
including the disciplinary rules of professional conduct
currently articulated in the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
as well as controlling constitutional decisions and generally
31. Id. Preamble.
32. Id. Rule 2.1.
33. Id. Rule 2.1 cmt.
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accepted principles established in leading federal and state
cases and in procedural and evidentiary rules....
The purpose of the [MPRE] is to measure the
examinee's knowledge and understanding of established
standards related to a lawyer's professional conduct; thus,
the MPRE is not a test to determine an individual's per-
sonal ethical values .... 34
The M.P.R.E. is a multiple-choice test, presenting the
examinee with factual situations, each of which is followed by a
question requiring application of the norms of professional con-
duct. The examinee is instructed to "pick the best answer from
the four possible answer choices" provided for each question. 5
The majority of questions specifically test knowledge of the disci-
plinary rules and doctrines that would subject a lawyer to disci-
pline, sanction, disqualification, or civil or criminal liability.
While some questions ask what is "proper" conduct on the part
of a lawyer, the instructions do not ask the examinee to deter-
mine what is proper through moral reasoning, but rather to
apply authoritatively promulgated standards and "generally
accepted principles." 6
The construction of professional responsibility as a field of
law, characterized by the separation of law and morality typical of
the law school construction of fields of law generally, is directly
and clearly signaled in the primary teaching materials available
on the market for professional responsibility courses. These
materials are, almost without exception, casebooks, taking exactly
the form of the teaching materials used in conventionally legal
fields of property, contracts, torts, and so forth. 7 Like the books
developed for these other areas, the casebooks in professional
responsibility often include a good deal of material other than
cases-snippets from news articles, paragraphs from law journal
34. National Conference of Bar Examiners, THE MPRE (MULTISTATE PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION): 2000 INFORMATION BOOKLET 2, 26
(1999).
35. Id. at 28.
36. Id.
37. Some books are more unconventional than others, and probably
more idiosyncratic than most is JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RIcHARD W. PAINTER,
PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER (1997). Yet even
Noonan and Painter's highly unconventional (and sparsely adopted) book is
built around cases, though their choice of cases is fairly unusual. The principal
exception to the casebook model is NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL REsPON-
SIBILITY. PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION (1996), which consists
entirely of problems and text, with no reproduced cases.
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pieces, or excerpts from books.3 8 But also like those other books,
the professional responsibility casebooks clearly signal that these
are extra-legal materials. They belong to philosophy, sociology,
political science, economics, or some other non-legal field. They
are not law. The fundamental presumption-and the message
for students-is that professional responsibility is a field of law, to
be taught and learned exactly as any other field of law, by refer-
ence to distinctly legal materials which contain or explicate the
relevant doctrinal principles.3 9
Moreover, the casebooks focus on law, i.e., the constellation
of regulatory provisions to which lawyers must conform their
conduct. The object seems largely to expose students to the
rules in force relating to the principal professional responsibility
issues of confidentiality, competence, loyalty, and zealous advo-
cacy. Most books focus on the Model Rules or the Model Code,
indeed, the stronger the focus on the rules, the better the book
seems to sell.4" Of course, the rules-focus of most of the more
38. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN
THE PRACTICE OF LAw (1995). The authors state:
We follow each problem with a series of readings .... Many of these
readings are cases, excerpts of law review articles, formal ethics opin-
ions, or our own analysis. But many of the readings are more collo-
quial-accounts from legal periodicals, or newspaper accounts from
the popular press. We consider all these readings to be of equal
importance. Certain readings provide more black letter analysis, while
others are more important for making the ethical principles more
accessible and easier to grasp, or for providing a strong dose of
practicality.
Id. at 3.
39. See, for example, STEPHEN Giu..Rs, REGULATION OF LAwYERs:
PROBLEMS OF LAw AND ETHICS 1 (5 ' ed. 1998), the first words of which are: "As
the Preface cautioned, 'legal ethics' is something of a misnomer for the subject
of this book and the courses likely to use it.... What you are studying is the law
governing lawyers." Id. ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & TERESA S. COLLETT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE RULES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION V (1996) opens as
follows:
The focus of this casebook is on the rules of the legal profession. We
focus on the rules of the profession because they are important. The
rules establish minimum standards for lawyers. They establish a frame-
work within which lawyers operate. Their importance to lawyers and
law students is obvious: violations of the rules may subject lawyers to
professional disapproval, discipline, fines, procedural sanctions, and,
in some cases, liability.
Id.
40. The more traditional, rule-oriented books outsell their less conven-
tional rivals by considerable margins. As one publisher's representative put it:
Of our books, the MORGAN & ROTUNDA [infra note 43], easily the most
traditional, continues to be the most popular with adoptions at over 75
schools each year. The HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON [infra note 46]
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popular books does not preclude the use of the supplementary,
"enrichment" materials described above. Yet, those materials
appear, as they do in casebooks in other legal fields, to explicate
the "policy" aspects of the professional responsibility. Like con-
tracts, with its (potentially conflicting) policies of facilitating
wealth-maximizing transactions and protecting reliance, and like
torts, with its (potentially conflicting) policies of penalizing fault
and spreading costs, the regulatory law of professional responsi-
bility is understood to be based on (potentially conflicting) poli-
cies to which it is important that students be exposed, such as the
policy to promote open communication between lawyer and cli-
ent and the policy to promote the truth-finding function of trials.
These policies, like the policies in the other established legal
fields, are presented as internal to the field, conflicts within the
law itself, and not as instantiations of larger social problems in
the "real" world. They help the student or lawyer understand the
ambiguities of the existing rules, and they provide the basis for
arguments about how the rules should be interpreted, but, like
the rules themselves, they are presented as givens, as pieces of
the existing regulatory structure that attorneys must master.
This typical structure of professional responsibility
casebooks reinforces a message about the relationship between
professional responsibility and "ethics"-a message typically
delivered in their prefaces, introductions, or opening chapters.
Almost every one of the leading casebooks begins by considering
the relationship between professional responsibility or legal eth-
ics, on the one hand, and "ethics" on the other. With rare excep-
tion," the books sharply distinguish legal ethics from "ethics"
has a wider scope (rules plus related legal doctrine, criminal statutes,
fiduciary responsibility) of coverage than [MORGAN & RoTuNDA] and
usually numbers adoptions at 40+ law schools. The more philosophi-
cal of the books have a smaller audience. In part this is due to
expressed student resistance to this type of approach.
E-mail from Paul Thomson, Foundation Press, to Jane B. Baron (June 21, 2000)
(on file with author) (citation alterations added).
Reports from other major publishers are consistent. The GILLERs casebook
(see supra note 39) is adopted at over four times as many schools as the less
conventional CRYSTAL book (see supra note 37). E-mail from George J. Serafin,
Aspen Law and Business, toJane B. Baron (June 21, 2000) (on file with author).
See also e-mail from Peter R. Hinsch, West Publishing, to Jane B. Baron (June
22, 2000) (reporting that the most traditional books far outsell the less tradi-
tional books) (on file with author).
41. See, e.g., NOONAN & PAINTER, supra note 37, at ix. But this book has
been adopted for use in only a dozen professional responsibility courses, as
compared to the more traditional MORGAN & ROTUNDA book, described infra
note 43, which has over 100 adoptions. E-mail from Paul Thomson, Founda-
tion Press, to Jane B. Baron (June 21, 2000) (on file with author).
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(the latter term nearly always appearing, as we have put it here,
in quotation marks), and they explain why the two fields bear
only the most tenuous of connections. For those who under-
stand the field in fundamentally regulatory terms, i.e., as an
"expression of the limits of conduct by people acting in the role
of lawyer," it follows almost axiomatically that "being morally
good or morally bad is not the primary inquiry" in the field.4" Of
course, philosophy can be "useful" in this view, but only as a
means of showing that "uncritical applications of the text of the
Model Rules and Code to a problem are ... not enough,"4" or as
a possible source to which to turn if "there is 'no rule on point;"'
or when "the rule on point is so 'open textured' that you need
more guidance"; or when "the rule on point permits or requires
conduct that seems morally repugnant."4 4 But however useful
philosophy might be, the reader of these casebooks clearly
understands that it is not law.
Some books are quite cynical about the divide between legal
and philosophical ethics, explaining that "the profession hopes
to trade on the ideal of [philosophical] ethics, but it has not
especially appealed to classical ethical principles in elaborating
the rules governing the behavior of lawyers."45 Other books
42. MOLITERNO, supra note 4. Moliterno's book begins by explaining that
"above all else, the law governing lawyers is law. It must be studied and mastered
like any other law field." Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
43. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILIY. PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 13 (7th ed. 2000). For Morgan and Rotunda,
"ethics" is clearly in the background, while the law of lawyering is in the fore-
ground: "The dilemma for any course such as this one is how to acknowledge
philosophical traditions while recognizing that most questions of modern legal
ethics are debated in more traditional legal terms." Id. (emphasis added). In the
view of these authors, philosophy can be helpful, in a sort of hints-from-Heloise
way, by contributing distinctions such as that between complying with minimum
standards and attaining ideal behavior or between "what we want a lawyer to do
and the kind of person we want a lawyer to be." Id. at 14-15. The authors
clearly conceptualize law as a separate field: "'legal ethics' offers an unusually
good opportunity to apply the insights of history, sociology, economics and phi-
losophy to fundamental legal questions." Id. at 2.
44. MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, RICHARD C. WYDICK AND REX R.
PERSCHBACHER, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 5 (4th ed. 1997).
45. GILLERS, supra note 39, at 9. Gillers, like Moliterno, believes that the
subject of professional responsibility is the legal regulations governing lawyers.
"Legal ethics,'" he states, "is something of a misnomer for the subject of this
book and the courses likely to use it .... What you are studying is the law
governing lawyers." See also id. at xxii ("Here [in this book] you learn the rules
you have to live by and the consequences if you ignore them."). Gillers admits
that in the last two decades, ethicists and legal academics have looked at law-
yers' ethics in light of moral philosophy, but he is dubious about the impact of
such inquiries on the field.
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seem more wistful about the gap between "ethics" and "legal eth-
ics." One such book explains that because philosophical ethical
norms are "cast as universals in which all others are entitled to
equal respect and consideration," they are not truly suited to the
actual practice of law: "Rules of legal ethics are not universal
because they give a preferred position to clients; the office of
lawyer begins with having to make distinctions among persons."46
The notion here seems to be that it would be wonderful if there
were a larger overlap between "legal ethics" and "ethics," but,
sadly, such an overlap is not truly possible.
Even the rare book that asserts a connection between legal
and philosophical ethics4 7 underscores the fundamental differ-
ence between them. Consider, for example, the following
statement:
The study of codified ethical rules apart from broader ethi-
cal principles runs the risk of superficiality: legal codes of
personal conduct that ignore the moral commitments of
the people they govern are doomed to irrelevance. On the
other hand, a purely philosophical study of legal ethics
that ignores the institutional and doctrinal basis of law
practice cannot succeed.48
The principal message here is that neither the law governing law-
yers nor philosophical ethics can be studied in isolation. But
there is a less obvious message as well-that there is a purely phil-
osophical realm, separate, independent and distinguishable from
the legal realm of doctrine and institutional practice context.
Presumably the latter is the distinct domain of legal ethics. "Eth-
ics" and legal ethics may be connected, but the two realms do
not-and apparently cannot-collapse into one.
So far there has been little cross-fertilization, as a practical matter,
between the philosophical and the professional enterprises ....
Moral philosophers may teach at law schools and influence law teach-
ers, but they have not yet been invited to join the profession's ethics-
writing committees .... So while the philosophers are not going to go
away and are in fact becoming more influential in the academy, the
force of their influence on the courts and the practicing bar has yet to
be determined.
Id. at 10.
46. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SusAN P. KONIAK, AND ROGER C. CRAMTON,
THE LAW AND ETHics OF LAWYERING 3 (3d ed. 1999).
47. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHics 3 (2d ed.
1995) ("In a broader sense .... legal ethics is simply a special case of ethics in
general, as ethics is understood in the central traditions of philosophy and
religion.").
48. Id.
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In sum, the separation of law and morality that characterizes
the law school construction of law generally applies specifically to
the construction of professional responsibility as a field of law.
This separation, which is a dimension of law's autonomy, is com-
plemented by the tendency (noted above) of the law school cur-
riculum to separate fields into discrete subject matters. Thus,
professional responsibility is typically taught in its own course.
Professional responsibility, accordingly, is defined as something
different from torts, contracts, criminal law, civil procedure, or
property.
That is not to deny points of intersection. Professional
responsibility norms are often triggered by the contractual
aspects of the lawyer-client relationship or the misappropriation
of client property. In addition, violation of those norms can
result in civil or criminal liability. More to the point, issues of
professional responsibility can arise in the drafting of a contract,
the litigation of a personal injury case, or the representation of a
criminal defendant. However, as they are constructed in the law
school curriculum, one can (and frequently does) study torts,
contracts, criminal law, and so forth without ever addressing pro-
fessional responsibility issues.
Put differently, professional responsibility is not understood
to be intrinsic to these other fields. Rather, it is intrinsic to its
own object of concern: the practice of law.49 Accordingly, at least
in the first year of law school, a sharp distinction is made between
the kinds of doctrinal questions that lawyers frequently address-
questions of interpreting statutes, synthesizing cases, drawing
analogies and distinctions, framing issues, characterizing facts,
among many others-and ethical "problems" and "dilemmas"
which can arise in the course of legal practice. 0 The former
questions are properly explored in each substantive law school
course. They have cognitive and practical dimensions, but have
49. See, e.g., GiLLEPs, supra note 39 ("Other courses teach lessons that
bear on your clients' problems. This course is for you."); MORGAN & ROTUNDA,
supra note 43, at 1 ("[T]he subject of the course in professional responsibility is
the legal profession itself. Law students may use the substance of their torts
course periodically, but they will use the substance of professional responsibility
daily. This course is about lawyers as they engage in the practice of law.");
ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 38, at 1-2 ("[T]he goal of this volume .. . is to
help you prepare for the ethical dilemmas you will certainly face as a practicing
lawyer.").
50. Of course, later in law school, when students take the course in pro-
fessional responsibility, they will learn to perform on professional responsibility
rules the same doctrinal moves (interpretation, synthesis, etc.) they learned to
perform on the rules of property, contracts, and the like. For further discussion
of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 110-13.
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neither a moral dimension (because law is different from moral-
ity) nor a professional responsibility dimension (because profes-
sional responsibility is a different field). In them lies the heart
of the lawyer's craft, which is constructed as ethically neutral in
character. And as a field of law, professional responsibility has its
own doctrinal concerns: ethical problems and dilemmas-i.e.,
the ethical potholes that lie along the otherwise morally smooth
road of legal representation.
But at the same time, professional responsibility is a field of
law and therefore shares with other legal fields an affinity for a
distinctively legal form of reasoning. Thus, the same techniques
used to interpret and apply the law of torts or the law of trusts
and estates are appropriate for interpreting and applying the law
of professional responsibility.
Among those who resist this separation, a common response
is to call for the "pervasive" teaching of professional responsibil-
ity.52 But the pervasive method amounts largely to the teaching
of generic professional responsibility issues (loyalty, confidential-
ity, competence, and so forth) as applied to various areas of prac-
tice. That is, professional responsibility's doctrinal concerns
continue to be constructed as practice issues, not matters intrinsic
to the various doctrinal fields. Even a somewhat ambitious
approach, such as Scott Burnham's approach to teaching ethics
in the contracts course,5" can easily fall into this pattern. Thus,
the ethical issues raised by Burnham generally involve situations
when the lawyer might be tempted to lie,54 to withhold impor-
tant information,5" to shape the client's sworn statement,56 to try
51. There are, of course, important exceptions in law school curricula
throughout the United States. Consider, for example, the "Integrated Transac-
tional Program" at Temple University, which combines instruction in the nor-
mally separate fields of trusts and estates, business law, and professional
responsibility, along with instruction in drafting, interviewing, negotiation, and
counseling. For a description of this program, see Eleanor W. Myers, Teaching
Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values with Theory and Practice, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 401 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Scott J. Burnham, Teaching Legal Ethics in Contracts, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 105 (1991); Robert N. Covington, The Pervasive Approach to Teach-
ing Professional Responsibility: Experiences in an Insurance Course, 41 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 355 (1969); Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing:
An Overview of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDuc. 75, 87-89
(1991); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31
(1992).
53. See generally Burnham, supra note 52.
54. See id. at 112, 115-16 (misrepresenting negotiating position or misrep-
resenting facts in an answer in order to raise statute of frauds).
55. See id. at 112-15 (withholding knowledge of law, facts, mistakes in tran-
scribing agreements).
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to get away with what she understands to be legally impermissi-
ble. 7 These examples are not particular to contract doctrine,
but are instances in a particular context of temptations generally
present throughout the practice of law.
Moreover, pervasive approaches can easily replicate the law-
morality dichotomy reflected in the Model Rules. Consider Burn-
ham's statement of his "Goals and Objectives":
My goals for teaching ethics in Contracts are to (1) detect
ethical problems, (2) apply the Code or Rules to the prob-
lem, (3) recognize the limitations of the Code or Rules, and
(4) resolve the problem based on personal morality .... 58
We can see in Burnham's approach precisely the structure identi-
fied by Simon. Professional ethics comprises mandatory rules on
the one hand and personal morality on the other. Morality
remains outside the law of professional responsibility.
II. THE CONTINGENCY OF THE CONSTRUCTION
It is important to understand that law need not be con-
structed in a way that separates law and morality into two distinct
fields. Indeed, much jurisprudential ink has been spilled in
attempts to figure out just what role morality plays in ordinary
legal reasoning.59
If, in contrast to the traditional and still standard law school
construction, we were to construct law as inextricably intertwined
with morality, such a construction would have an important
56. See id. at 111-12 (coaching the client with respect to the content of an
affidavit).
57. See id. at 118-19 (inclusion in a contract of unenforceable exculpatory
clause).
58. Id. at 108.
59. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw (rev. ed. 1969) (from a
perspective that combines natural law and legal process theories); H.L.A. HART,
LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963) (from a positivist perspective). For note-
worthy debates on the law-morality problem, see the exchange between Fuller
and Hart: H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV.
593 (1958) and Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, at 630 (1958); and the exchange between Fuller and
Ernst Nagel: Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3 NATURAL LAW
FORUM 68 (1958) and Lon L. Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3 NATURAL
LAW FORUM 68, at 83-104 (1958).
Of course, there are systems within the Western legal tradition that under-
stand law and morality to be intimatelyjoined. Classical natural law is one such
system. See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Question 90, 4th Arti-
cle, in INTRODUCTION TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 615 (Anton C. Pegis ed., 1948).
The Jewish legal tradition is another. See, e.g., Adin Steinsaltz, THE ESSENTIAL
TALMUD, 200-201 (1976).
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implication for professional responsibility. For if the materials of
law are understood to be moral materials, and if legal reasoning
is understood to be moral reasoning, then all lawyering activities
necessarily have moral significance.6 ° And every lawyer's task will
raise ethical issues.
To see this, let us consider the manipulative techniques dis-
cussed earlier. Lawyers are accustomed to a certain degree of
"play" in the operation of legal rules. Some legal rules are pur-
posely phrased, not in hard edged, bright line, crystalline terms,
but instead as muddy, imprecise standards (e.g., "reasonable-
ness") that virtually invite arguments over how they should be
applied.61 Even bright line rules have immanent but unwritten
purposes that may contradict their literal terms. Facts can be
characterized in dramatically different ways-as innocent misun-
derstandings or culpable misstatements, for example. And these
illustrations could be multiplied through all the diverse tasks in
which lawyers engage, from drafting agreements through trying
cases in court. There would be little to negotiate in the drafting
process if existing rules clearly and unequivocally allocated risks
to one party or another; there would be little to argue about in
court if both the facts and the law were transparently clear.62
60. For an especially sophisticated illustration that works out this idea, see
WiLLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAwYERs' ETHICS
(1998). Simon employs a Dworkinian understanding of an autonomous law
that incorporates a rich mix of moral principles. Accordingly, he argues that
"[1]awyers should take those actions that, considering the relevant circum-
stances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice." Id. at 138. Simon
goes on to say:
"Justice" here connotes the basic values of the legal system and sub-
sumes many layers of more concrete norms. Decisions about justice
are not assertions of personal preferences, nor are they applications of
ordinary morality. They are legal judgments grounded in the meth-
ods and sources of authority of the professional culture. I use "justice"
interchangeably with "legal merit." The latter has the advantage of
reminding us that we are concerned with the materials of conven-
tional legal analysis; the former has the advantage of reminding us
that these materials include many vaguely specified aspirational
norms.
Id. As we suggest, Simon's reliance on the field-of-law model perpetuates some
of the law-morality problems inherent in that model. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 125-37.
61. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law,
40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAw 320,
320-21 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
62. In the traditional law school construction, lawyers construct strategies
to advance their clients' interests by routinely finding and exploiting these
open spaces of the law.
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But what fills the interstices of law? If legal rules are even a
bit indeterminate, and the "play" with which lawyers are familiar
suggest that they are, then what determines the outcome of dis-
puted cases? There is no consensus within either academia or
the bar on the answer to this question.6" Some would argue that
the care with which arguments are crafted makes the difference,
so that between equally plausible legal positions the judge will
choose the one that has been presented better (but of course
what constitutes "better" is not always clear). Others would argue
that when the legal arguments are equally balanced it is policy
that determines the outcome (although policy arguments may be
equally balanced as well). Still others would argue that judges
always retain some range of discretion and that, in exercising
that discretion, their personal preferences (which may or may
not be "political" in nature) will be brought into play. Certainly,
it is common practice for attorneys to research prior opinions
written by the judge on legal issues similar to the one at hand in
order to predict what the judge "likes" to hear in such cases.
We offer no resolution to this debate. As we suggested ear-
lier, however, part of what fills the interstices of rules could be
morality. We say "part" because we do not mean to deny that
quality of presentation, policy argumentation, awareness of the
judge's decisional patterns, or any of a number of other factors
may affect the outcome of cases. We assert only that one dimen-
sion of legal indeterminacy can be moral. That is, the interstices
of law create space for moral, as well as other concerns to be
considered.
63. Until the twentieth century, this quality of law was not especially con-
troversial. Theorists from Aquinas to Langdell understood and embraced it.
(Indeed, the law school tradition of "Socratic dialogue" exploits this very fea-
ture of law.) But first the Legal Realists and then legal scholars associated with
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) were understood to suggest that law's "indetermi-
nacy" gave judges room, in effect, to do anything they wanted and/or to impose
their personal political preferences in deciding cases-political preferences
that generally advanced the interests of the economically, socially, and politi-
cally powerful. Putting aside the question whether anyone within CLS truly
made such a claim, see Balkin, supra note 17; Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984), the experience of most lawyers is quite
different. It is the experience of limited freedom to maneuver within a fairly
tight space. That is, the rules are perceived to limit dramatically the arguments
that can be made and the facts that can be plausibly argued to be relevant (so
that, for example, it would not be permissible to argue or to decide that a party
should lose a case simply because of his race), but the rules are also perceived
to leave considerable space for lawyers to argue about the proper outcome. For
a detailed explanation of how legal rules can both limit and open space for
legal arguments, see Greenstein, supra note 16.
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If we construct law this way, the manipulative techniques
learned by law students take on an interesting character. Techni-
cal decisions, such as how to frame the "issue" in a case, or even
whether to regard a set of facts as a "case" at all, have nontrivial
moral dimensions.
Consider a prosecutor who must decide whether to bring
charges against a man who is alleged to have raped a woman
after a date. The evidence shows that the woman went out with
the man voluntarily and consented to accompany him back to his
apartment. At this point, the man's and the woman's version of
events diverge, with the woman claiming the man forced her into
sexual intercourse and the man claiming that the two had con-
sensual "rough sex." The technical dimensions of the prosecu-
tor's decision are fairly obvious, involving factors, such as
whether the conduct in question can plausibly be argued to be
within the scope of the applicable rape statute, whether there is
independent evidence to support either party's account of the
events, whether the woman (or the man) is likely to be perceived
sympathetically by ajury, and so forth. Unfortunately, the ethical
dimensions of the prosecutor's decision do not scan as easily.
Yet, assuming that the local statute, like most rape statutes, could
be read to reach the man's actions, then the prosecutor must
decide whether it ought to be argued to reach them, i.e., whether
the state should be seeking to discourage conduct of this kind,
and this decision clearly has a moral dimension. And if the pros-
ecutor decides not to bring the case because he thinks based on
experience in the community that conviction is unlikely, this
decision has a moral dimension as well, for it effectively endorses
the community's existing understandings of what is tolerable and
intolerable between men and women.
Sometimes the moral dimensions of ordinary, technical,
legal decisions are obvious. When the prospective client is the
Ku Klux Klan seeking to march in Skokie, Illinois, most observers
will recognize that the decision whether to take the case is, in
some respects, a moral one. In the majority of cases, however,
the moral dimensions of the decisions to be made are much less
obvious. Here, the invisibility of moral issues is often confused
with their absence. Moreover, if we suppose that moral consider-
ations can saturate the porous texture of the law, then not only
does the decision whether to handle a particular case or pursue a
particular prosecution take on moral significance, but other
activities that constitute the lawyer's craft do so as well. Here are
two examples: framing issues and applying the law.
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A. Framing the Issues
Most lawyers and law professors would include the ability to
"frame the legal issue" among the technical skills that law stu-
dents should master. It is well understood that the framing of
the issue affects which rules and facts will be deemed relevant, as
well as what remedies might be available. Thus, when a client
approaches an attorney with a "problem," the attorney will imme-
diately begin to categorize the problem (civil/criminal, con-
tract/tort, etc.), sort through the client's narrative of events for
doctrinally important facts (color of leaves on trees, not impor-
tant; color of traffic light at accident scene, important), and
anticipate the legal problems (the "issues") that might stand in
the way of the client obtaining the result she or he seeks. So, for
example, if a client describes a contract dispute, but the lawyer
believes there was no consideration on the facts as the client
recounts them, the lawyer might probe for additional facts con-
cerning the client's reliance on the other party's conduct, and
then "frame the issue" in terms of the more doctrinally sustaina-
ble theory of promissory estoppel. If there is truly a considera-
tion problem, the promissory estoppel framing is just good
lawyering because it makes legally irrelevant the absence of a bar-
gained-for exchange between the client and the opposing party.
(The really good lawyer might also try to characterize the facts in
a way that demonstrates that there actually was a bargained-for
exchange, even though that exchange is not readily apparent.)
Lawyers understand that there are many ways to frame an
issue. Indeed, they understand an important element of their
craft to be their sense, based on intuition and experience, of
which framing will be most effective. That is, they experience
themselves as having to make choices about how to frame the
issue. They do not tend to understand that choice as a moral
one.
But let us examine two actual cases, Dothard v. Rawlinson65
and UAW v. Johnson Controls.66 Both cases involved Title VII chal-
lenges to employer policies that excluded women, but not men,
from certain jobs in prisons (Dothard) and in battery manufactur-
ing plants (Johnson Controls). In both cases, the issue was framed
64. The examples used in this section and the one that follows are drawn
exclusively from litigation. This bias simply reflects our backgrounds and the
types of problems with which we are most familiar. We are confident that the
very points we are exploring in this Part could be made, mutatis mutandis, in
transactional and other nonlitigation contexts.
65. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
66. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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as whether the exclusionary policy in question could be justified
as a "bona fide occupational qualification" (B.F.O.Q.). The
Court held in Dothard that the policy of excluding women from
contact positions in men's maximum security prisons could be
justified as a B.F.O.Q., but it held in Johnson Controls that the pol-
icy of excluding women from lead-exposure jobs in battery man-
ufacturing plants could not be justified as a B.F.O.Q.
On conventional analysis, the female plaintiff lost in Dothard
and won in Johnson Controls. From a feminist perspective, cer-
tainly, there is much to dislike about Dothard. The Court held
that a female employee's "very womanhood would . . . directly
undermine her capacity" to perform her responsibilities as a
prison guard.67 This sort of statement presumes both that
women have some sort of essential nature and that that nature is,
in certain contexts, disabling or inferior. On the other side, in
Johnson Controls, the Court seemed to affirm women's capacity to
make important decisions for themselves; it held that "it is no
more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual employ-
ers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is more
important to herself and her family than her economic role.
Congress has left this choice to the woman as hers to make."'
And on a practical, as well as a rhetorical level, Johnson Controls
seems a better decision for the plaintiff, and for the other women
the plaintiff represented,69 than Dothard, for in the former case
the jobs in question were opened up to women, whereas in the
latter the jobs remained closed.
Yet, on reflection, it is not clear how to judge either case.
Had the women plaintiffs prevailed in Dothard, they would have
had the privilege of working anywhere in Alabama's prison sys-
tem, a system whose conditions were described by the Supreme
Court as "peculiarly inhospitable . . . for human beings of
whatever sex" and by a federal District Court as characterized by
"rampant violence" and a 'jungle atmosphere."7" Meanwhile,
the women plaintiffs who prevailed in Johnson Controls gained the
privilege of working in jobs that posed a clear danger not only to
their own reproductive health, but to the health of any fetus they
might carry during their employment.71 It is not obvious why the
67. 433 U.S. at 336.
68. 499 U.S. at 211.
69. Both suits were class actions.
70. 433 U.S. at 334.
71. "Respondent Johnson Controls, Inc., manufactures batteries. In the
manufacturing process, the element lead is a primary ingredient. Occupational
exposure to lead entails health risks, including the risk of harm to any fetus
carried by a female employee." 499 U.S. at 190.
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loss of an opportunity to work in conditions potentially violative
of the Eighth Amendment should be lamented, nor obvious why
the acquisition of an opportunity to work in conditions injurious
to health should be celebrated.
The problem in both of the cases derives from the way the
issue was framed. In each case, the background conditions in
which the women would work were left unquestioned.72 In
Dothard, the Court asked, in effect, whether, in prisons that were
already extremely violent, it would be safe to have women in con-
tact positions with prisoners. In Johnson Controls, the Court asked,
in effect, whether, in a manufacturing process that exposed
workers to high levels of lead, it was legitimate to exclude women
in order to preserve their reproductive health. The Court did
not ask the critical questions: why the prisons were violent or why
battery workers were exposed to such high levels of lead. These
questions are not unthinkable nor obvious only in hindsight.
The prison conditions assumed in Dothard were under direct
attack even as the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims. And while
there was no analogous suit challenging the manufacturing pro-
cedures assumed in Johnson Controls, the question of tort liability
was raised in connection with the B.F.O.Q. defense, so the rea-
sonableness of the existing battery manufacturing process could
not have been entirely out of the Court's mind.
The effect of the framing of the issue was and is not trivial.
It subjected the plaintiffs and those they represented to a lose-
lose proposition in which if they won, they would be in danger;
and if they lost they would be denied choices men were free to
make. This framing has a moral dimension. The lawyers who
brought both suits arguably applied their talents to making their
clients' lives dangerous-successfully in the case of Johnson Con-
trols. It is surely not self-evident that putting one's client at risk of
physical harm is a morally correct thing to do. And, physical dan-
ger aside, there were other serious risks inherent in framing the
issue in terms of parity with men. Such a framing, as feminists,
such as Catherine MacKinnon have long pointed out, creates the
standard that women must aspire to whatever it is that men
have;7" if men can work in lead exposure jobs without regard to
fertility, women can; if men can work in contact positions in ram-
pantly violent prisons, women can, too. Asking that women be
72. On the technique of refraining issues so as to move questionable (but
unquestioned) assumptions from the background to the foreground, see
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) 24749 (1997).
73. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex
Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAw 32
(1987).
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treated like men may be a reasonable way to advance their inter-
ests, but then again, it may not. The decision to go in this direc-
tion is more than simply tactical. If women ask to be treated as
men are treated in instances where (as in the case of pregnancy)
women seem to be different, they effectively invite courts to
engage in a compare-and-contrast exercise in which women may
well be judged inferior."4 To a feminist, the Court's characteriza-
tions of women and "womanhood" in Dothard seem downright
silly, but most people do not read Supreme Court opinions with
a feminist eye. To them, the Court's characterizations may seem
both accurate and authoritative. Again, it is not self-evident that
putting one's client at risk of being deemed inferior is a morally
correct thing to do.
One standard response to these observations is that, notwith-
standing the moral dimensions of the framing problem, the law-
yer bears no personal moral responsibility because in the end it is
the court that determines what the issue is and how to resolve it.
While it may be comforting to think that the judge will somehow
"fix" framing problems, it is hardly realistic. Judges are not free
simply to ignore the issues the parties bring before them and
instead tell parties that they should bring some different sort of
action for some different relief. While the Court is undoubtedly
responsible for its own rhetoric in Dothard, and while the plain-
tiff's lawyer may not have anticipated that the Court would react
to the case as it did, it does not follow that the lawyer is, for those
reasons, not accountable for the rhetorical and practical results
reached in the case. Once the issue is framed in terms of
women's capacity to serve in contact positions in prisons, the law-
yer cannot control the outcome, and an insulting finding of inca-
pacity becomes possible as a direct result of the way the attorney
has framed the case.
But, it might be argued, what if the plaintiffs in Dothard and
Johnson Controls wanted to be treated the same as men, and asked
their lawyers to file suit seeking equal treatment? Isn't it the law-
yer's obligation to carry out the client's expressed wishes,
allowing the client to make the critical choices about what ends
to seek? These questions are important, but they dramatically
oversimplify the relationship between client and attorney. Cli-
ents do not come to lawyers with "cases," but with human
problems. It is highly unlikely that the plaintiffs in Dothard or
Johnson Controls entered into their lawyers' offices specifically ask-
74. There is substantial literature on the sameness-difference debate. See,
e.g., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: THE DIFFERENCE DEBATE (Leslie F. Goldstein ed.
1992).
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ing the lawyers to file a class action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 or talking of B.F.O.Q.s. It is far more likely
that they simply described their experiences seeking the jobs
they wanted. It is the lawyer who "constructs" or "transforms" the
facts the client supplies into a legal "case."75 Nor is it true, in the
instances where several different kinds of cases could be brought
to remedy the problem with which the client approached the
attorney, that the choice of which possible course to pursue is
made primarily (let alone solely) by the client. Lawyers repeat-
edly note that the manner in which they present choices to the
client has a dramatic impact on what the client chooses to do.76
Since there is no completely neutral way to present alternatives
and every presentation will necessarily emphasize some factors
over others (if only by presenting some factors or options first
and others later or last), the lawyer will inevitably be involved in
and influence the choices made by the client.
Of course, we have focused in this discussion on the moral
implications of framing vis-a-vis the client's well-being. There are
additional moral dimensions to the framing issues in Dothard and
Johnson Controls. For example, insofar as the lawyers in those
cases framed the issues in such a way as to leave the background
conditions unchallenged, they failed to seize available opportuni-
ties to address situations that posed harm to others-to inmates
and guards in Dothard, to male workers in Johnson Controls.77 The
standard response is that the lawyer's job is to represent the cli-
ent's interests, not those of third parties.78 However, that
response merely reframes the moral question without answering
it.
The lawyer, then, is necessarily implicated in the task of
framing the issue, a role lawyers tend to be less anxious to deny
when they have been successful in a case (though, as we have
seen, evaluating success can be difficult). Although the framing
of the issue seems but a technical legal skill, part of the "craft" of
lawyering, it can be understood to have a moral dimension, for
every framing highlights some facts as problems, but treats
75. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons
of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
76. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs.
Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REv. 213 (1991).
77. See KENNEDY, supra note 72, at 248 ("We assert that something that is
background for others is causally important in the hope that if we are right, and
we can make people see it, we will make it plausible that there are more ways to
change the status quo than previously appeared.").
78. See infra note 101 (quoting Lord Brougham's famous speech on the
lawyer's duty of loyalty).
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others-even quite troubling facts, such as the inhumane condi-
tions of the prisons in Dothard -as givens. Seen this way, moral
decisions are woven into lawyers' everyday technical work.
B. Applying the Law
In law school, students learn to apply the law to facts, and
practicing lawyers use this skill every day. A client seeks a divorce
and wants to know whether she will be able to keep a country
home she inherited from her parents. In order to answer this
question, the lawyer will consult the relevant equitable division
statute to see what it says about property acquired by gift or
inheritance. If it is ambiguous, the lawyer might also examine
the case law interpreting the statute. The lawyer must take the
language of the statute and the holdings of the cases and apply
them to the facts as the client has explained them. If, for exam-
ple, the statute exempts from equitable division property inher-
ited before the date of the marriage, and the client's parents
died before she married, the lawyer will likely advise her that the
law will permit her to keep the country home.
As with issue framing, sometimes the application of law to
facts is not straightforward, and it is possible to generate diver-
gent arguments about what the law does and does not permit.
Imagine, for example, that the equitable division statute exempts
property received by one spouse through inheritance, but
includes property received by gift to both spouses. Assume also
that, subsequent to her marriage, the client's parents devised the
house solely to her, but only after the client, her husband, and
their children had spent multiple summers with the client's par-
ents in the home, and after discussions indicating the parents
wanted the country house to go to "them" (the client and her
husband) because they obviously loved the house so much.
Here, a literal interpretation of the statute would support the
conclusion that the wife will be able to keep the house after
divorce, but most lawyers will see a possible argument that, not-
withstanding the form of the devise, the house was meant as a gift
to both spouses and should be subject to equitable division.
Ambiguities such as these are quite common in legal prac-
tice. Indeed, they are what keeps legal practice interesting, for
they call upon the lawyer's skill in constructing arguments-mar-
shaling facts, reading statutes and case holdings carefully, under-
standing the intent of the statute and the rationales of the
relevant cases, etc. Lawyers understand that multiple arguments
are possible on both sides and, as with issue framing, they under-
stand an important element of their craft to be their sense, based
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again on intuition and experience, of which arguments will be
most effective. That is, they experience themselves as having to
make choices about which arguments to advance and how to
advance those arguments. But, as with issue-framing, lawyers do
not tend to understand these choices as moral in nature.
Imagine a lawyer in Palisades Park, New Jersey, whose client
asks him whether he can build a motel at a certain location
within the town. The year is 1955. The lawyer examines the
local zoning map and determines that the land in question is
located in an area zoned "District A." District A is generally
restricted to one and two family dwellings and apartment houses.
While the ordinance is silent as to hotels and motels, "boarding
and rooming houses" are expressly permitted in the A District.
The ordinance defines a boarding house as "any dwelling in
which more than six persons not related to the owner or occu-
pant by blood or marriage are lodged and boarded for compen-
sation." A rooming house is defined as "any dwelling wherein
furnished rooms are rented to more than six persons for com-
pensation, provided, however, the lodging of relatives, by blood
or marriage, of the owner or occupant of such dwelling shall not
come within these terms."
Should the lawyer advise the client that the zoning ordi-
nance permits the motel to be built? Unless a motel is not a
"dwelling," it would seem to fit easily within the statutory defini-
tion of boarding and rooming houses, and since those are per-
mitted uses, it would seem the motel is permitted as well. Let us
hope that the attorney did not state this conclusion too defini-
tively, for in the case from which these facts are drawn, Pierro v.
Baxendale,79 the court found:
[M] otels may without difficulty be differentiated from board-
ing and rooming houses. Motels are business institutions
which cater to members of the general public and by and
large obligated to serve them indiscriminately. As such
business institutions they possess, in substantial degree, the
attributes which have led to the exclusion of businesses
generally from residential zones. On the other hand,
boarding and rooming houses may select guests with care
and are admittedly "less public in character." They are
located in buildings which have the outward appearances
of private dwelling houses and their commercial features
and incidents are insignificant when compared to those of
motels.
80
79. 118 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1955).
80. Id. at 405 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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"What?," you might think. "The statute doesn't say anything
about 'business institutions,' and anyway, it defines boarding and
rooming houses in terms of lodging 'for compensation,' so why is
it a problem that a motel is a business? And where does the stat-
ute say anything about the buildings' 'outward appearance' or
'public character'?"
On second thought, however, it is not difficult to imagine
the kind of argument that produced the court's holding. Stat-
utes have not only language, but purposes as well, and it is clear
that the lawyer for Palisades Park argued that, notwithstanding
the ordinance's literal terms, its intent was not to allow the build-
ing of motels within the municipality. He must have been pretty
persuasive on this score, as the court held that, "as we view the
terms of the ... ordinance the borough contemplated the exclu-
sion of hotels, motels and similar businesses from the residential
zones without, nevertheless, curbing the right of dwelling house
owners or occupants to use their premises for boarding and
rooming house purposes. ""'
How could the township attorney persuade the court to
reach this conclusion given the clarity of the statute? The opin-
ion's final paragraphs may provide at least a partial answer to this
question. The court there meditated on whether the municipal-
ity's exclusion of motels was a proper exercise of its zoning
powers:
[W]e need but look about us at our many blighted urban
and even suburban areas to observe the combined effects
of lack of municipal vision and restrictive judicial pro-
nouncements. We are satisfied that at long last conscien-
tious municipal officials have been sufficiently empowered
to adopt reasonable zoning measures designed towards
preserving the wholesome and attractive characteristics of
their communities and the values of taxpayers'
properties ....
The environmental characteristics of many of our
beautiful residential communities are such that the estab-
lishment and operation of motels therein would be highly
incongruous and would seriously impair existing property
values. We know of no sound reason why such communi-
81. Id. at 403 (emphasis added). The court's conclusion that the statute
implicitly excluded motels is all the more surprising in light of the fact that
within a week of plaintiffs application for a building permit, the borough
amended its zoning ordinance to expressly prohibit "motels, motor courts,
motor lodges, motor hotels, tourist camps, tourist courts, and structures of a
similar character intended for a similar use." Id. at 402. Under the court's
interpretation of the original ordinance, the amendment had no legal effect.
2001] CONSTRUCTING THE FELD OF PROFSSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 71
ties may not, as part of their comprehensive zoning, rea-
sonably exclude such enterprises.
8 2
Here, we seem to have reached something different from techni-
cal argumentation about statutory language and purpose. We
confront the value-laden question of the kind of community Pali-
sades Park is going to be-a community that risks the presence
of "blighting" motels, or a community that stoutly preserves high
property values and the virtues of suburban life. With the clear
hindsight of forty years and the infamous Mt. Laurel3 exclusion-
ary zoning decisions, the suburban values being invoked seem
somewhat less wholesome than the court suggests. In terms of
persuasion, however, it is clear that the invocation of property
values and motels' potential to destabilize them was extremely
powerful. Against the destruction of Palisades Park's beauty,
what could the plaintiff possibly offer? A few measly dollars of
extra tax revenue?
Many lawyers would characterize the final paragraphs of the
Pierro opinion as a classic "policy" argument. As noted earlier,8 4
policy arguments could be understood to be fundamentally
moral arguments, i.e., arguments about important values and
desirable consequences. But when used in legal argumentation,
policy becomes Janus-faced. For the lawyer seeking to persuade
the court, policy is one more strategic tool to advance the client's
interests. Indeed, American legal education teaches that poli-
cies, such as deterrence, cost-spreading, or intent effectuation
underlie large bodies of doctrine, and students learn to make
policy arguments along with more technical doctrinal arguments
throughout their law school careers. On the other hand, for the
judge, who must choose among conflicting understandings of
the law, policies can help bring to light what conflicting values
are at stake. Thus, for the judge, policy has a distinct moral sig-
nificance. In this light, the court's reliance on the policy behind
the zoning statute is hardly shocking.
8 5
82. Id. at 408.
83. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
336 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Hills Dev. Co. v.
Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (NJ. 1986); Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. See also discussion infra Part
III.B.
85. But see KENNEDY, supra note 72, at 110 ("Policy arguers present it as
different from pure politics, or ideology, because it appeals to universal rather
than particular interests .... There is nonetheless a serious problem ....
Although policy argument formally excludes ideology, it is 'soft' and so operates
always under the suspicion of permitting ideology to enter sub rosa."). As we
note in our Conclusion, our use of the terms "morality" and "moral" are delib-
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Let us think a little more about the particular policy invoked
in this case. First, it is not entirely obvious, given the language of
the statute, that its policy is to exclude all business enterprises
from residential zones, preserve property values, or prevent
blight. Could not the policy of the statute plausibly be argued to
be an expansion of owners' freedom, even within residential
zones, to use their property for profit, so long as those profits
come from lodging people?
Second, even assuming the court correctly characterized the
statute's policy, are not other important policies at issue in the
case? For example, as read by the court, the zoning ordinance
does not actually provide notice of what uses are permitted or
forbidden within District A zones. Notice and the predictability
that follows from it are also important policies within the law.
Why are these policies not even mentioned?
Finally, the opinion's closing paragraphs invoke the desira-
bility of community self-determination and responsible, respon-
sive government. These are value judgments. The values in
question are purchased at a price. If the motel is not permitted
in Palisades Park, those who might have stopped there will go
instead to the neighboring town of Fort Lee, where motels are
permitted.86 Presumably the residents of Fort Lee, having lacked
the foresight to prohibit motels, deserve to face the risk of blight
and low property values Palisades Park has avoided. This is also a
value judgment-a quite controversial judgment about the
acceptability of externalizing certain social costs onto other com-
munities. Calling the values in question "policies" dresses them
in comforting pseudo-scientific garb, but the cloak cannot totally
hide the lurking moral questions about how local democracies
ought to behave when faced with what are perceived as threats to
those "inside" the community's walls.
Our point is that garden variety standard legal techniques
for applying law to facts, or for arguing about the application of
law to facts, encode moral positions that tend not to be recog-
nized as such. "Plain meaning" arguments encode positions
about the importance of notice, while "legislative intent" argu-
ments encode positions about the importance, in a democracy,
of giving effect to the choices of elected representatives. "Policy"
arguments encode moral decisions about how social relations
ought to be structured.
erately expansive. We do not contest Kennedy's characterization of such value
judgments as political or ideological in nature. Our point is that they are also
moral.
86. 118 A.2d at 402.
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Lawyers make these arguments all the time, thinking of
them as purely strategic. But there is another way of thinking
about what the lawyer does when making policy arguments. She
seeks to persuade the court to choose one set of values over
another, to persuade the court that the world should be this way,
rather than that way. That can be understood straightforwardly
as moral argumentation. If the lawyer "wins," she has not merely
achieved the client's goals, but since legal decisions have conse-
quences, she has also helped shape the world for the immediate
and third parties, who will be affected by the new decisional law.
Looking at the matter this way, we might think that the lawyer's
arguments about how to apply law to facts carry with them moral
accountability.
III. SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE "FIELD"
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Conventional wisdom has it that professional responsibility
is a relatively new field of law. The Watergate scandal and the
subsequent low esteem in which the public held lawyers, among
other factors, pushed the subject into far greater prominence
than it had previously held in law schools. The development of
newly-required courses in the subject created a cadre of academ-
ics who devoted their principal efforts to professional responsibil-
ity issues and gave such issues scholarly respectability.
The same decades that saw an explosion of attention to pro-
fessional responsibility have seen widespread interest in the
potential connections between law and other disciplines. "Law
and society", 7 "law and literature",8 and especially "law and eco-
nomics" have all become increasingly influential.8 9
Yet, despite this relatively new academic interest in profes-
sional responsibility and despite the current academic fashion of
breaking down interdisciplinary boundaries, the dominant
understanding of the field of professional responsibility in legal
education has a surprisingly antique feel. Professional responsi-
bility could easily be seen and constructed as another blended
87. For an overview of the law and society movement, see Marc Galanter
& Mark Alan Edwards, Introduction: The Path of the Law Ands, 1997 Wis. L. REv.
375; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763
(1986).
88. For an overview of the law and literature movement, see Jane B.
Baron, supra note 8.
89. The influence of law and economics is conceded even by its critics.
See ROBIN WEST, CARING FORJUSTICE 180 (1997) (conceding that law and litera-
ture, for example, is a "marginal movement" as compared with law and
economics).
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field-"law and ethics," perhaps, or more broadly, "law and phi-
losophy." Yet, as we have described in the preceding sections,
this is precisely not how the field has been defined. If anything,
the field as it appears in the law school curriculum seems
opposed to definition in terms other than the regulatory provi-
sions that make up the "law of lawyering." Constructed largely
along Langdellian lines, professional responsibility is widely
understood to comprise distinctly legal materials, to address dis-
tinctly legal issues, and to coexist only contingently with other
disciplines, including ethics.
In this Part, we consider the appeal of this construction of
the field. In the first section we explore its connection to the
dominant conception of the lawyer's role as that of neutral parti-
san and to the justification of that role in terms of the adversary
system. We argue that the dominant conception demands a sub-
stantial amount of ethical freedom for the practicing lawyer to
offer her clients zealous advocacy, even if doing so results in acts
of injustice, and that the construction of professional responsibil-
ity as a barren field of legal doctrine seems to promise that free-
dom. But as many leading professional responsibility scholars
have shown, this allure rests on shifting sands. Neither the
model of neutral partisanship nor the moral justification of the
adversary system nor the requirements of professional responsi-
bility doctrine is sufficiently stable and coherent to provide the
required ethical freedom. We offer a summary of those demon-
strations of the field's indeterminacy and wonder about the fact
that they have largely been ignored.
In the second section, we suggest that the construction of
professional responsibility as a field of law, separate-even auton-
omous-with respect to other fields, such as ethics, reflects the
enormous and enduring power of Langdell's vision of law gener-
ally as a discrete, self-contained discipline. So tenacious is this
vision that even the most trenchant critics of the dominant law
school construction of professional responsibility, scholars, such
as David Luban and William Simon, cannot escape the hold of
Langdellianism.
And so at the end of this Part, we return to the very notion
of a legal "field." To many, professional responsibility cannot be
taken seriously as a field of law, worthy of study and considera-
tion by law students and lawyers, unless it is constituted by and
contains precepts that are distinctly legal. While not everyone
would define "distinctly legal" the same way, it is clear that the
more a group of principles-in this case, the principles of profes-
sional responsibility-takes the familiar form of the existing law
of torts, contracts, and so forth, the more recognizable it will be
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as "law." But the pressure to make professional responsibility
look like other areas already recognized as law has the quality of
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Only because we have already decided
that a legal field must be constituted by legal rules do we demand
that rules be the focus of our new legal field. The question is why
there is so deep and widespread an investment in constructing
legal fields around doctrine, and distinguishing them so dramati-
cally from other, clearly related fields such as "ethics" or "philos-
ophy."9" The field of professional responsibility retains an old-
fashioned, Langdellian autonomy, an autonomy perhaps less
complete than Langdell himself might accept,91 but still suffi-
ciently pronounced to surprise those who are confident that
American law has somehow passed through or transcended its
need to be an autonomous discipline.
9 2
A. The Allure of the Law School Construction
of Professional Responsibility
1. Promises of the Law School Construction
In this section, we consider why the Langdellian construc-
tion of law and professional responsibility is dominant in the law
school curriculum. What is its allure?
Perhaps most importantly, the construction of professional
ethical issues as potholes, which the attentive lawyer can antici-
pate and avoid or safely negotiate, resonates with the standard
conception of the lawyer's role as the neutral partisan, who zeal-
ously advocates in pursuit of the client's goals within the bounds
of the law. Zealous advocacy is a commodity for which there is a
great demand,93 and to provide that commodity, the practitioner
requires considerable freedom from ethical constraint in two
senses. First, if the lawyer's role is to advocate zealously the cli-
ent's goals, the lawyer needs to be free of constant fear that her
90. For general observations about this phenomenon, see Jane B. Baron,
Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship as Guilty Pleasure: The Case of Law and Literature,
in LAW AND LiTERA-muPE 21 (Michael D.A. Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds.,
1999).
91. On Langdell's views, see Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, supra
note 3; Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, supra note 3.
92. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REv. 761 (1987).
93. There may also be great demand for service to the interests of the
community at large. Robert Post has suggested that because society wants law-
yers to "uphold the right and denounce the wrong" and also to serve individual
interests against those of the larger community, lawyers are caught in a contra-
diction. Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark
Glass, 75 CAL. L. REv. 379, 380 (1987).
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tactics and strategies on behalf of the client will risk professional
or legal sanctions. Second, as a matter of self-respect, most law-
yers will want to believe that their conduct is ethically justifiable
in the larger sense of (nonlegal) ethical considerations, and this
requires freedom from those ordinary ethical constraints that
might clash with zealous advocacy. The particular construction
of law and professional responsibility typically found in the law
school curriculum seems to promise this ethical freedom to a
substantial degree.
a. Freedom from Sanction
By the time the law student finally takes the course in Profes-
sional Responsibility, she has likely encountered many images of
the lawyer: the advocate, the counselor, the "statesman,"" the
"people's lawyer" dedicated tojustice.95 But surely the dominant
image is the culture's standard conception of the lawyer: the neu-
tral partisan. Part of that conception is an attitude that treats
legal doctrine as material to be mastered and manipulated for
strategic maneuvering in the service of the client's interests.
And so when the law student takes the course in Professional
Responsibility and encounters yet another body of legal doctrine,
she knows exactly what skills are needed to engage it successfully.
There is no obvious reason why the previously learned skills of
case analysis, synthesis, interpretation, fact analysis, issue fram-
ing, and logical application of law to facts should not permit mas-
tery of the law of professional responsibility. And the law student
knows exactly how decisions are to be made when the inevitable
"play in the joints" is encountered; they are to be made strategi-
cally to serve the client's interests.
Here, however, the interests to be pursued strategically are
not just the client's, but also the lawyer's own. In the standard
conception, both the client and the lawyer (and hence, the law
student) have an interest in reducing the size of the ethical
potholes through the interpretation and application of profes-
sional responsibility doctrine. We see that the lawyer/law stu-
dent has such an interest not just by inferring a self-defensive
urge to minimize the degree of disciplinary peril attending the
lawyer's work. More generally, the ideology of neutral partisan-
ship generates strong incentives to shrink the potholes. For, if
the lawyer's job is to pursue the client's self-defined interests,
94. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 11-14 (1993).
95. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in Law, in BUSINESS-PROFES-
SION 321 (1914).
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then navigating ethical problems impedes and slows down that
pursuit, and constant fear of sanctions can chill the lawyer's zeal.
The entrenched reaction of law students to approach the
law of professional responsibility strategically like any other body
of law is encouraged by the very form of that law. The center-
piece of the doctrine in this field is a code of ethical rules, typi-
cally based on the A.B.A.'s Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which possesses several features that affirmatively reinforce the
student's inclination to think about ethical problems as potholes
and approach the rules governing those problems strategically.
First, the immediate source of the ethical rules is external to
the individual whose conduct is governed. Like other bodies of
law, they are promulgated by an authoritative rule-maker, typi-
cally, the supreme court of the state. When ethical rules are
promulgated by an external authority, does one follow the rules
because it is the right thing to do or because obedience to an
external authority is required? If the rule-maker is presumed to
be good, as when the rule-maker is a god, these two motivations
merge. But the government is not a deity; consequently, the
identity of the right and the required is hardly self-evident.
When the professional ethical rules are disengaged from any nec-
essary connection to ordinary morality, the issue becomes one of
compliance. In the universe governed by such rules, the central
ethical question is not, "What should I do?" but, "Is this conduct
allowed?" And, freed from any necessary connection to ordinary
morality, the lawyer/law student is at liberty to approach this
question strategically-to minimize the ethical potholes lying in
the way of zealous advocacy.
Second, the meaning of the ethical rules is variable. This is
so because disparate principles can inform the interpretation of
any rule. As with any legislation, one can give an ethical rule its
plain meaning, the meaning intended by its author, or the mean-
ing that carries out its purpose. And, as with other rules that the
student has practiced with over the years, the selection of an
interpretive approach can be further complicated by irresolvable
disagreements over the plain meaning, the authorial intent, or
the rule's purpose. To the extent that the meanings generated
by these necessary choices are inconsistent, the ability of ethical
rules to guide behavior is compromised. As with other rules
encountered by the student, the variable meaning of the rules of
ethics openly invites strategic interpretation to narrowly constrict
their scope.
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Third, ethical rules are both under- and over-inclusive.96 As
with variability of meaning, this feature stems from a characteris-
tic of all rules, namely that the language of rules is general, while
the situations to which they apply are particular. Thus, a rule
requiring a child to be in bed by nine o'clock may on its face
improperly prohibit her staying up to watch an important educa-
tional program that ends at nine-thirty, and improperly permit
her to stay up until nine when she is sick and ought to go to bed
early.97 Since no amount of specification will cure this problem,
the implications for an ethical regime are clear: insofar as ethics
are defined by rules, some right conduct will be prohibited and
some wrong conduct will be allowed. Again, this feature invites
strategic interpretation. Students are drilled in the skills of
exploiting the under- and over-inclusiveness of rules to the cli-
ent's advantage by shifting back and forth between interpretive
modes (plain meaning, legislative intent, purpose analysis, etc.)
in order to shape the reach of the rules to permit the desired
conduct. It is a relatively straightforward task to employ those
skills to the student-lawyer's advantage in dealing with the A.B.A.
Model Rules.
Fourth, ethical rules, like all rules (even the most crystal-
line), have qualities of vagueness and open-texture.9 8 A rule is
vague insofar as the boundary between which situations are
addressed by the rule and which are not is indistinct. In such a
case, it cannot be determined without modification of the rule
(by formally amending the rule or through interpretation)
whether a situation falling at the boundary is included or
excluded. A rule is open-textured insofar as all future situations
to which the rule might be applied cannot be anticipated. Again,
no amount of specification will immunize a rule from either
vagueness or openness of texture. For ethical rules, this means
that we can expect to encounter ethical problems that are
underdetermined by application of the rules. As with the second
and third features discussed above, the student arrives in the pro-
fessional responsibility course well practiced in exploiting the
vagueness and open texture of rules.
96. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 31-34 (1991).
97. For another examination of legal reasoning and parents' bedtime
rules, this time from the perspective of the child, see Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime
Story, 74 VA. L. REv. 915 (1988).
98. The idea that language has an uneliminable "open texture" is gener-
ally attributed to Friedrich Waismann. See Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, in
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE: FIRST SERIES 117 passim (Antony Flew ed., 1951). For its
application to legal rules, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120-32
(1961); SCHAUER, supra note 96, at 34-37.
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In sum, these four characteristics of a code of professional
ethics encourage strategic approaches. First-year instruction
teaches students that obedience to externally promulgated rules
turns on their meaning, which turns on interpretation and appli-
cation. Students are further taught that interpretation and appli-
cation are flexible precisely because rules are variable in
meaning, over- and under-inclusive, vague, and open-textured.
The interpretive skill lawyers apply to provisions of a commercial
code to argue that the statute either allows, requires, or forbids
the conduct in question can be readily employed to construe the
provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The self-inter-
est and internalized ideology of student-lawyers lies in advocating
for maximum autonomy in their legal practice, which means
arguing for interpretations of the rules that shrink the ethical
potholes to the greatest degree.
b. Freedom from Moral Accountability
The standard conception of the lawyer as a neutral partisan,
who uses his knowledge and skill to zealously advance the goals
of the client, seems to countenance injustices. That is, the con-
ception seems to require lawyers to do things that would, by ordi-
nary ethical standards, be considered immoral.9" Consider the
lawyer who successfully raises a statute of limitations defense on
behalf of his client to defeat the collection of a just debt.100 Con-
sider the lawyer who successfully impeaches a truthful witness to
secure the acquittal of a dangerous criminal. The public recoils
at the image of the lawyer as a hired gun, inflicting injustices on
individuals and society as a whole to carry out the wishes of the
client.'0 1
99. See generally ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE
MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999); see also Postema,
supra note 21.
100. See Resolution 12 in David Hoffman, Resolutions of Professional Deport-
ment (1836), quoted in LUBAN, supra note 21, at 10 ("I will never plead the Statute
of Limitations, when based on the mere efflux of time, for if my client is conscious
he owes the debt; and has no other defence than the legal bar, he shall never
make me a partner in his knavery.").
101. The famous summation of this position is Lord Brougham's speech
before the House of Lords during the trial of Queen Caroline. "An advocate,"
he insisted, "by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows in the discharge
of that office but one person in the world, that client and none other." The
lawyer must be willing to risk "all hazards and costs, to all others, and among
others to himself . . . ." Indeed, the lawyer must even be willing to risk
"involv[ing] his country in confusion for his client's protection." Quoted in
Deborah Rhode, An Exchange on Adversarial Ethics: Text, Subtext, and Context, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 29, 29 (1991). See also Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers:
Why Should We Care, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 1405 (1999). Robert Post has
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Since we can assume that most people, including most law-
yers, wish to think of themselves as basically moral, we need to
see how the lawyer from her first days as a law student constructs
a reliable moral justification for the standard conception. That
justification is found in the vision of law and legal practice con-
sistently and relentlessly presented and reinforced throughout
law school, beginning in the first-year curriculum. For in that
vision, dominated by the conception of the lawyer as a neutral
partisan, the dominant ethical value is loyalty to the client, 102 and
the justification for the priority of that value is the essentiality of
the advocate's role in the adversary system, which is itselfjustified
in consequentialist terms. 10 3 That is, the adversary system is
presented (along with all the essential roles within the system) as
producing a net benefit to society, even if it also necessarily pro-
duces local injustices along the way.
Moreover, even with regard to those local injustices,
accountability is displaced. It is the client who chooses the goals;
it is the jury who decides the facts; it is the judge who decides the
law. The lawyer's role is instrumental: to assist the client in
achieving her goals and to show how the facts and the law can be
construed to favor those goals. The lawyers who represented the
Klan's desire to march in Skokie were not vouching for the virtue
of the march (the Klan had that responsibility), nor did they
have the power to decide that the march was proper (the judge
had that responsibility).104 Similarly, the criminal defense lawyer
noted that the public's disenchantment is profoundly ambivalent. Analyzing a
1986 survey of public attitudes toward lawyers, What America Really Thinks About
Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18, 1986, at S-3, Post observes that while the public
objects to the fact that lawyers "manipulate the legal system without any con-
cern for right or wrong" and "file too many unnecessary lawsuits," the public
also approves of the fact that lawyers' "first priority is to their clients" and that
they "know how to cut through bureaucratic red tape." Post, supra note 93, at
380 (quoting id.).
102. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical World of Large-Firm Litigators: Pre-
liminary Observations, 67 FORDrHAM L. REv. 709, 737 (1998); W. Bradley Wendel,
Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 1, 47-62
(1999).
103. See SIMON, supra note 60, at 53; David Luban, The Adversary System
Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAwYERs' RoiEs AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 93-104
(David Luban ed., 1983) [hereinafter GOOD LAWYER]. Nonconsequentialistjus-
tifications have been offered. See, e.g., id. at 113-117 ("pragmatic"justification);
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship, 85 YALE L. J.1060 (1976) (lawyer is a "special purpose friend").
However important such nonconsequentialist arguments have been within the
academy, the public at large and the professional disciplinary institutions
largely rely on the consequentialist rationales.
104. Cf Wendel, supra note 102, at 55 ("The Jewish lawyer who argued in
favor of the Nazis' right to march in Skokie, Illinois was not motivated to
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who allows her client to testify, knowing that she intends to com-
mit perjury, is not accountable for the perjury; that is the client's
decision and responsibility.
Hence, the freedom from moral accountability demanded
by the conception of the lawyer's role as that of neutral partisan
is provided by a construction of the legal system in which the
lawyer plays a specific and essential role. On the one hand, the
role is justified (including any bad consequences of carrying out
the role) because the system as a whole is justified. On the other
hand, other actors assigned other roles are delegated responsibil-
ity for the ethical dimensions of the representation.
10 5
The foregoing discussion has argued that the typical law
school construction of law and professional responsibility has a
strong appeal because it powerfully complements and supports
the standard conception of the lawyer's role as neutral partisan
by substantially clearing the lawyer's activity of moral constraints.
However, other dimensions of its appeal should not be
shortchanged.
The first year of law school demands an intellectual rigor
that is exhilarating for many students and which, along with the
arcane language in which law is presented, lends an air of elite
dignity and power that coincides with some of the important
increase the Nazis' freedom to terrorize his people; instead, he located the
value of his efforts in the goal of vindicating important First Amendment val-
ues."). See generally ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY. AMERICAN NAZIs, THE
SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979).
105. Actually, even the judge largely escapes moral accountability in the
law school's account of law. The judicial role is itself constructed in terms of
craft. Thejudge'sjob is to decide cases in terms of precedent, i.e., in a manner
consistent with past decisions. The notion of consistency that is reinforced in
the first-year study of law is a thin one, largely devoid of moral significance. By
contrast, when Ronald Dworkin argued that consistency should be understood
in rich terms that include background moral and political values, RONALD
DwO~MN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, ch. 4 (1977), he was under-
stood by many to be theorizing in the natural law tradition. See, e.g., Thomas
Morawitz, Law as Experience: Theory and the Internal Aspect of Law, 52 S.M.U.L.
REv. 27, 47 n.74 (1999); Richard A. Posner, Dworkin, Polemics, and the Clinton
Impeachment Controversy, 94 Nw. U.L. REV. 1023, 1035 (2000). For Dworkin's
early views on this reading of his work, see Ronald Dworkin, "Natural" Law
Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). See also ANTHONYJ. SEBOK, LEGAL POSI-
TIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 239-40 (1998). Accordingly, a common view
of law students is to divide cases in which the judge is seen to "follow the law,"
from those in which the judges' decisions are deemed "result oriented"-the
latter being decisions that clearly involve choices among competing values.
82 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15
motivations for attending law school.1"6 Once this understand-
ing of intellectual rigor is internalized, the construction of pro-
fessional responsibility as a field of law follows. That is, students
come to expect that a serious topic of study will look like the first-
year courses. Accordingly, a Professional Responsibility course
that looks different-in which, for instance, the teacher focuses
on problems and employs a discursive pedagogy-will likely be
perceived as "soft," not rigorous, not to be taken seriously.' 07
In addition, the construction of law and legal ethics in terms
of authoritative sets of rules and attendant doctrines appeals to
the predominant ethical orientation of beginning law students.
The available research indicates that as compared with the gen-
eral population, incoming law students disproportionately view
ethics in terms of an objective set of social rules and norms which
should be followed for the sake of order and stability more than
for their tendency to achieve specific justice in each individual
situation. 10 8 Moreover, for the minority of first-year students who
arrive with a more contextualized or relational or deontological
ethical orientation, the research suggests that their consistent
and relentless confrontation with the dominant construction
reshapes their ethical views toward the rules-and-order model.10 9
2. The Indeterminacy Problem
We can summarize the discussion thus far. In light of the
way professional responsibility is placed and taught within the
law school curriculum, many students and practicing lawyers
come to think of professional responsibility issues in some variant
of the following: legal "ethics" involve a small group of problems
primarily having to do with issues of confidentiality, conflicts and
the like. In the relatively rare instances when such problems
arise, the lawyer should consult the A.B.A. Model Rules or other
analogous regulations in force in his or her jurisdiction. As the
Rules confirm, the lawyer's role is best understood as that of a
neutral partisan; the client determines the ends of the represen-
tation, and the lawyer's job is to zealously pursue those ends
(within the bounds of the law, of course). Sometimes, the lawyer
in her role as neutral partisan will feel obligated to perform an
106. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research
on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337, 1356-62
(1997).
107. See Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibil-
ity: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 247.
108. See Daicoff, supra note 106, at 1395-1403.
109. See, e.g., Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Rea-
soning, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 193 (1991).
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act she feels is unjust, such as raising a statute of limitations claim
to defeat a just debt, or withholding information that, if known
to the other side, would affect ongoing negotiations, or impeach-
ing a witness the cross-examining lawyer knows to be telling the
truth. While acts such as these might seem deceptive or wrongful
outside the legal context, they are justified within the legal con-
text, where the adversary system governs. The norms of the
adversary system ensure that any "wrongs" on one side will be
righted or balanced by the equally zealous efforts of the attorney
on the other side. Out of the clash of the two sides' strongly
represented interests, truth and/or justice will emerge.
As we suggest, this understanding of professional responsi-
bility issues has a powerful appeal for law students and practition-
ers. The malleability of professional responsibility doctrine holds
out the promise that lawyers can provide their clients with zeal-
ous advocacy without fear of sanctions, even if their zealous advo-
cacy generates local injustices toward opposing parties, third
parties, or the general public. In addition, neutral partisanship
and the adversary system rationale hold out the promise of moral
justification for these local injustices.
This view of lawyers' ethics is often called the dominant
view. 110 What is interesting about its dominance is that each and
every part of it has been thoroughly and persuasively shown to be
internally contradictory and incoherent. Its robust survival
within legal education, as well as its largely uncritical acceptance
by law students and practicing lawyers, is truly astounding.
a. The Indeterminacy of Professional Responsibility Doctrine
Once professional responsibility is constructed as a field of
law, i.e., as a series of regulatory provisions with supporting poli-
cies, the field must struggle with all the usual problems that make
it difficult to apply rules in a straightforward manner. As we have
described, within the curriculum the particular constellation of
rules governing professional responsibility become but a new
sphere on which to practice harmonizing, distinguishing, inter-
preting, analogizing, and so forth. Paradoxically, even as the
casebooks construct the field as a field of law, they demonstrate
how few answers the rules in the field actually provide. For
instance, a case interpreting a rule one way is typically followed
by a case interpreting the rule very differently in order to demon-
strate the pull of the competing values animating the rules. Fact
pattern after fact pattern is offered to show how various duties of
confidentiality potentially conflict with duties of candor to the
110. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 60, at 7.
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tribunal or how duties of loyalty to client potentially conflict with
duties to serve the public interest.
Thus, if professional responsibility is constructed to look just
like a field of law, then it will behave just like a field of law. The
same techniques that allow the self-serving lawyer to contract the
scope of ethical potholes will allow the lawyer's critic to expand
those potholes. The variability, over- and under-inclusiveness,
vagueness, and open texture that characterize the Model Rules
work both ways. These features allow an advocate to contract the
scope of the professional responsibility law to maximize the free-
dom for zealous advocacy, but they also permit the critic to
expand the scope of the law to limit that freedom. Monroe
Freedman, appealing to professional responsibility doctrine,
made powerful arguments for why criminal defense lawyers may
ethically put a client on the stand, knowing that the client
intends to commit perjury.111 In response, then Federal Circuit
Judge (later Chief Justice of the United States) Warren Burger,
appealing to professional responsibility doctrine, made powerful
arguments for why such conduct is unethical.112
As leading figures in the field have acknowledged, the Model
Rules and their counterparts cannot resolve arguments, such as
those between Freedman and Burger because those codes are in
some measure the source of the arguments. The codes them-
selves provide that the lawyer owes duties to self, client, and the
public interest without providing any sort of algorithm for resolv-
ing conflicts among those potentially conflicting duties.11 ' Even
scholars who believe it is important to embody lawyers' ethics in
111. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilemma, 1
LITIG. 26, 28 (1975); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1478
(1966); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' Erni-cs IN AN ADvERSARY SYSTEM
(1975).
112. Warren E. Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Per-
sonnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRiM. L. Q. 11, 12-14 (1966). Judge Burger,
along with others, instituted unsuccessful disciplinary procedings against Freed-
man. See also Daniel J. Pope, Of Mice and Men, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 569 (1999);
Teresa S. Collett, Understanding Freedman's Ethics, 33 ARiz. L. REv. 455, 464-65
(1991); Bruce M. Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, in
GOOD LAWYER, supra note 103, at 191; Donald S. Liskov, Criminal Defendant Per-
jury: A Lawyer's Choice Between Ethics, the Constitution, and the Truth, 28 NEW ENC.
L. REv. 881, 905 (1994).
113. See, e.g., MOLITERNO, supra note 4, at 2:
Lawyers owe duties to clients, the justice system, third parties gener-
ally, opposing parties, the society, and the profession. There is a hier-
archy among these duties, but all difficult legal ethics questions
involve an attempted balancing among these duties. The law gov-
erning lawyers, at least the profession's self-regulation/rules, are
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codes of conduct are skeptical of such codes' ability to provide
clear answers to even the narrow realm of problems deemed
ethical.
b. The Indeterminacy of the Moral Justification of the Adversary
System
It is tempting for the lawyer to try to stabilize the ethical
landscape with its small potholes through recourse to the notion
that the lawyer's role is essential to the adversary system. If the
adversary system is itself morally justified by the net good it pro-
duces, then this line of reasoning should suffice to brace the law-
yer's narrow construction of ethical constraints against the
critic's attempt to expand those constraints. But how stable is
the proffered justification? Again, leading scholars in the field
have suggested it is not very stable.
The adversary system is principally justified by consequen-
tialist arguments, which claim that the lawyer's rigorous adher-
ence to the role of zealous advocate will, in the long run,
produce a net benefit to society in terms of truth,justice, and the
protection of rights." 4 In their most extreme form, they express
rule-utilitarian arguments to the effect that rigorous adherence
to the role is the best way of achieving truth,justice, or the protec-
tion of rights. Thus, the criminal defense lawyer can impeach a
witness she knows to be truthful because the conscientious pur-
suit of her role, along with the conscientious pursuit of the other
assigned roles by the other actors in the system, will produce
overall good consequences that outweigh this particular injus-
tice. In short, local incidents of injustice are permitted if they
are the necessary by-product of the lawyer's role as neutral
partisan.
David Luban has argued that the empirical claim that the
adversary system is an inherently superior way of maximizing
truth, justice, and the protection of rights is both unsubstanti-
essentially an attempted balance among the competing duties in given
contexts.
MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 43, at 28:
[1]n an important sense, any rules of professional conduct are an
attempt to accommodate at at least five interests... (1) lawyers as indi-
viduals, (2) lawyers in their relationships with each other, (3) lawyers'
responsibilities to their clients, (4) lawyers' responsibilities to non-cli-
ents with whom the lawyer deals, and (5) institutions of the legal sys-
tem through which the lawyer works.
Judge Noonan argues that these tensions predate formal codes of professional
conduct. NOONAN & PAINTER, supra note 37, at viii-ix.
114. See supra note 103, and accompanying text.
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ated and implausible.1 15 Even more fundamentally, consequen-
tialism of this ilk is hardly uncontroversial as a justification. A
Kantian, for example, may well believe that it is morally imper-
missible to deceive the fact-finder by intentionally presenting a
truthful witness as a liar-wrong notwithstanding the good con-
sequences that such conduct arguably produces. 1 6 Our point, of
course, is not to resolve the debate between consequentialists
and Kantians. We simply observe that a controversial moral justi-
fication for the adversary system (and by extension for the stan-
dard conception of the lawyer's role) will not necessarily satisfy
critics who do not view ethics from a utilitarian perspective. Fur-
thermore, there is no metatheory to resolve disagreement at this
level. Like the abortion debate, the debate over the justification
for injustices committed by lawyers within the adversary system
has little prospect of achieving anything resembling a consensus.
As a result, the lawyer cannot rely on that justification to shore
up and stabilize the desired ethical freedom to provide zealous
advocacy.
c. The Indeterminacy of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer's
Role
However, even if the utilitarian justification for the adversary
system were universally accepted, the standard description of the
lawyer's role within that system-that of neutral partisan-itself
raises difficult questions. What are the client's interests and
goals that are to be zealously advocated? As the earlier discussion
of the Dothard and Johnson Controls cases1 1 7 suggests, identifying
the clients' interests in those situations is problematic. What the
plaintiffs "won" in Johnson Controls--the right to choose to be
exposed to harmful lead-might not at all be in their long-term
interest.
But who is to say? In an influential article published in 1978,
William Simon demonstrated how quickly the concept of neutral
partisanship becomes problematic. 18 As a partisan, the attorney
"should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."" 9
But does that mean deferring to whatever the client believes to
115. See LUBAN, supra note 21, at 93-104. Simon has made similar kinds of
arguments. SIMON, supra note 60, at ch. 3.
116. See ROGER J. SUtIVAN, IMMANUEL KANr's MORAL THEORY 170-173
(1989).
117. See discussion supra Part II.A.
118. William Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv 29. See also Abel, supra note 1.
119. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.3, cmt. (1983).
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be in her interest, or does it mean helping the client to thought-
fully identify her interests? If the latter, what of neutrality? If
neutrality means not judging the client's goals, how can the law-
yer help the client thoughtfully identify those goals, for such an
exploration requires the lawyer to engage in critical judgment.
That is, the lawyer must be able to discern strategic, tactical,
political, economic, and ethical problems with the client's
designs.
And just why must the lawyer's evaluation include ethical
problems with the client's objectives? What business is it of the
attorney to get the client to focus on the moral implications of
the client's goals? Why, for example, should the lawyer care if
the client wants to defeat ajust debt by raising the statute of limi-
tations? One answer is that if the lawyer's role is to be a partisan
in the furtherance of the client's interests, it might be in the cli-
ent's interests to be a good person. That might be because the
client's standing in the community or in her business might be
adversely affected by unjust behavior. It might also be in the cli-
ent's interest to be a good person because the client really wants
to be a good person. The lawyer cannot know this without rais-
ing the issue, and the issue cannot be raised without exploring
the ethical implications of alternative courses of action. And if
the client does wish to be a good person and if the client has not
clearly thought through the relevant questions of right and
wrong, the lawyer who truly wishes to advance the client's goals
must provide counseling on these questions. But raising issues of
justice and providing counseling on these issues requires drop-
ping all pretence of neutrality, for it demands the exercise of crit-
ical ethical judgment. To help the client see what is right and
what is wrong, the lawyer has to be able to see and communicate
what is right and what is wrong.
In sum, it has been powerfully argued within professional
responsibility literature that the kind of exploration necessary to
thoughtfully determine the client's interests and goals requires
the participants to abandon neutrality and express judgments
about the various possibilities. For exactly the reason that it
would be contrary to the client's interests for the lawyer to be
"neutral" on questions about legal doctrine, it would seem that
the lawyer cannot remain neutral on questions about client inter-
ests, including the client's interests with regard to ethical
conduct.
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d. The Indeterminacy of Act Description
As Arthur Applbaum has shown, moral nonaccountability is
threatened also by the indeterminacy of act description. 120 The
lawyer defends the morality of impeaching a truthful witness by
appeal to the lawyer's role: it is morally permissible for a lawyer
acting in her role to impeach a truthful witness. Suppose this is
so. Nevertheless, the lawyer's critic can redescribe the conduct: a
human being is trying to deceive another into thinking that a
truthful person is a liar, and it is morally wrong for a human
being to engineer such a deception, all the more so when the
truthful person is innocent of wrongdoing. Thus, what for
nonlawyers would be properly described as deception (morally
impermissible) is for lawyers properly described as impeachment
(morally permissible). Which description is correct?
The answer might be both. The actor is both a lawyer and a
human being, and what is morally permissible for a lawyer to do
is impermissible for a human being to do. Yet the lawyer would
no doubt respond that there is a lawyer exception to the moral
obligation of human beings not to make a truthful person out to
be a liar. Thus, the lawyer's description trumps. But who says it
does? The lawyer says, and perhaps the profession says, and per-
haps the law schools say through their construction of law and
legal practice. But why is that binding on the critic? Why should
the critic cease to treat the actor as an ordinary human being
subject to ordinary moral constraints simply because he and his
profession and his school call the actor a lawyer and call his
deception impeachment? Clearly the legal profession cannot
impose its descriptions on those outside the profession. (Indeed,
it arguably cannot impose its descriptions on insiders.) Nor is
there any metaprinciple to decide between the competing
descriptions.
The lawyer's plea for moral nonaccountability receives
explicit support in the Model Rules' insistence that "[a] lawyer's
representation of a client . . . does not constitute an endorse-
ment of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or
activities." 2 ' But in the ordinary world, intentionally assisting
another to carry out certain objectives frequently is taken to con-
stitute such an endorsement of those objectives. The Model Rules
cannot enforce its claim by fiat; it must persuade through moral
argument. And if it cannot persuade critics to abandon their
alternative descriptions and attendant moral obligations, then so
120. See generally APPLBAUM, supra note 99, at ch. 5 (defining, describing,
and exploring this problem).
121. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1983).
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much the worse for the Model Rules and for the lawyers who
appeal to the Model Rules for ethical freedom. The Mafia hitman
can insist that contract killings are just fine within the governing
ethical principles of the Mafia, but that insistence is impotent to
preclude Mafia critics from calling those acts murder and hold-
ing the contract killer accountable for murder.
These four indeterminacies-the indeterminacy of profes-
sional responsibility doctrine, the indeterminacy of the moral jus-
tification for the adversary system, the indeterminacy of the
standard conception of the lawyer's role, and the indeterminacy
of act description-raise serious doubts about the capacity of
professional responsibility as constructed in the law school cur-
riculum to supply the ethical freedom lawyers seem to desire.
These indeterminacies have not been observed from the mar-
gins; arguments about them have been central to the scholarship
about professional responsibility. What is puzzling is how the
dominant view can retain its hold in the face of such fierce and
effective assaults. Hovering above all this is a point we have
repeatedly made: it is possible to construct positive law as satu-
rated with moral significance. In such a construction the incen-
tive is not to narrow legal constraints but to expand them. The
mystery is why such a construction is so rarely considered.
B. Three (or Four) Constructions of the Field
It is open to us to understand professional responsibility in
different ways, and each understanding has important conse-
quences. Generally speaking, we have maintained that profes-
sional responsibility has been constructed as a field of law. But
what does that mean? It turns out that it can mean several differ-
ent things, each of which has implications for our understanding
of professional ethics and, ultimately, for our understanding of
who we are as lawyers.
One thing it can mean is that professional responsibility con-
sists entirely of legal doctrine-legal rules, legal principles, legal
policies-which are applied to various factual situations utilizing
the forms of legal reasoning typical of other fields of law. This
seems to be the dominant understanding within law school
curricula.
Constructed in this way, professional responsibility holds out
many promises. It promises self-sufficiency. The lawyer can
resolve professional responsibility promises by mastering doc-
trine; recourse to other disciplines, including ethics, is unneces-
sary because they are outside the law and largely irrelevant to it.
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So constructed, professional responsibility also promises substan-
tial ethical freedom, protecting the lawyer from sanctions as long
as the doctrinal requirements are met and allowing the lawyer to
get about the business of zealous representation of the client.
The problem with this construction, as we have seen, is that com-
mentator after commentator has demonstrated the indetermi-
nacy of professional responsibility doctrine at all levels, so that it
can fulfill neither the promise of self-sufficiency (because mas-
tery of the doctrine does not dictate answers to the important
questions of professional ethics) nor the promise of freedom
(because the same techniques that expand the lawyer's freedom
under the doctrine can be used to contract her freedom).
A second thing that it can mean to construct professional
responsibility as a field of law is that professional responsibility is
separate from, but supplemented by other disciplines, especially
ethics. Put another way, professional responsibility can be under-
stood to be "law and ethics." Our sense from the literature and
from conversations with colleagues is that this approach repre-
sents a significant minority approach within law school curricula.
Constructed this way, our understanding of professional
responsibility doctrine is supplemented and improved by reach-
ing outside the doctrinal boundaries to a different discipline:
ethics. But it is important to see that ethics remains outside of
law. David Luban has argued, for example, that if "bodies of
legal doctrine are organized around principles and counter-
principles, which check each other," as some critical legal schol-
ars have maintained, then lawyers must appeal to moral
convictions in choosing among the competing principles.122 In
this formulation, law and morality remain separate, but con-
nected, domains.
Whether Luban is right-whether the practitioner must or
even should appeal to ordinary moral principles in general or in
particular cases-remains an open question. More to the point,
constructed in this way, it is not a legal question.12 The lawyer
can reach outside of law and engage in what Luban calls "moral
activism," '1 24 thereby investing her practice with morality. Or the
lawyer can reject Luban's counsel, remain within the legal field,
seek to comply with the doctrinal requirements of professional
122. David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873,
892 (1999). See also id. at 898 ("[T] he kind of legal analysis Simon favors can-
not even begin without a prior moral stance to orient it in an endless field of
possibilities.").
123. An interesting question is what kind of question it is. It could be a
moral question.
124. LuBAN, supra note 21, at xii passim.
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responsibility, and ignore the teachings of ordinary ethics. In
that sense, one can be a good lawyer, but not necessarily a good
person in much the sense that one can be a good plumber (by
mastering the technical knowledge and skill), but not necessarily
be a good person.
A third thing that constructing professional responsibility as
a field of law might mean is that morality is subsumed within law
and is, therefore, within the legal field of professional responsibil-
ity. William Simon argues that "lawyers should take those actions
that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular
case, seem likely to promote justice."12 He defines justice as
"legal merit."' 26 Of course, by "legal merit" Simon does not
mean to invoke the narrow regulatory model emphasized by the
leading casebook authors. He has a frankly Dworkinian view,
which he calls substantivism (in contrast to positivism). Substan-
tivism "interprets specific legal norms as expressions of more
general principles that are indissolubly legal and moral." 27 The
substantivist never considers the letter of a law without also con-
sidering its spirit or purpose; she never mechanically applies law
without considering whether that application is consistent with
or promotes the values beneath/behind/animating the law in
question.
Notice that Simon's substantivism puts all sorts of moral
norms inside the law. Law, Simon argues, incorporates/instanti-
ates ethical debates: "Conflicts the Positivist defines as law-versus-
morality take the form, for the Substantivist, of legal norms in
tension with each other." 28 As one commentator notes:
Simon's proposal ... demands, in essence, a reorientation
of the lawyer's professional role toward justice, but does not
demand incorporation of extra- or non-legal moral norms.
Rather, it demands a reorientation of the lawyer's profes-
sional role toward justice so as to be truer to the law itself....
It argues, to state the contrast a little differently, for a revi-
talization or even an enlargement of the lawyer's distinc-
tive professional role so that the lawyer pays his due to the
justice already inscribed in our law, rather than a diminu-
tion of the lawyer's distinctive professional role to better
align it with the dictates (and pieties) of conventional
morality.129
125. SIMON, supra note 60, at 138.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 82.
128. Id. at 99-100.
129. Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less than Ideal Legal
World, 51 STA. L. REv. 973, 981 (1999). See also Luban, supra note 122, at 886
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Whether Simon's views are correct is, of course, debatable. 3
What is more important is the contrast between substantivism
and the regulatory model. For Simon, ethics or morality are
already inside the legal field, amenable to consideration through
application of the techniques of legal reasoning. Legal reason-
ing necessarily involves moral reasoning, and legal merit necessa-
rily involves justice.
Consequently, questions that involved competing considera-
tions of "law" and "ethics" under the previous two constructions
are transformed within the third construction into law/law
problems. Simon contrasts these relationships as follows:
First, the law/law characterization suggests that the matter
is susceptible to resolution in terms of the analytical meth-
ods and sources of legal argument .... Second, the law/
law characterization suggests that the legal profession or
some subgroup of it might have some collective responsi-
bility for its resolution that might call for disciplinary
review or simply critical assessment. Moral considerations,
on the other hand, are presumed to be a matter for the
individual decisionmaker to resolve privately.
The [dominant construction] privileges the law/
moral characterization, and particularly the choices associ-
ated with "law." The psychological effect of this privileging
is to reinforce lawyers' commitment to conventional
responses-client loyalty in all cases where the client's
projects are not prohibited by the positive law, obedience
to positive law in other cases. Typically, the conventional
response is portrayed as the "legal" one, and competing
("Simon claims that if your interpretation of the law makes it morally unaccept-
able, the fault lies with your interpretation, not with the law.").
130. West asks why Simon does not define the justice lawyers are required
to pursue "by reference to the requirements ofjustice, rather than by reference
to law?" Id. at 988. She answers her own question as follows:
[W]e really do not have at our disposal a credible, or even coherent,
understanding of the requirements of legal justice, and one reason for
that is surely that both the law schools and the bar, at least in this
century, have simply neglected the task of producing one .... We
have no sustained body of scholarship that examines the concept. Nor
do we teach the concept of justice .... So, when the appealing sug-
gestion that lawyers should pursue justice is put forward, there are
seemingly only two alternatives for defining the justice those lawyers
ought pursue: Justice might be defined by reference to an idealized
conception of extant law, or justice might be defined by the personal
predilection of those individuals required to dispense it.
Id. at 988-89. For a strikingly similar observation, see Heidi Li Feldman, Matter of
Ethics-Apparently Substantial, Oddly Hollow: The Enigmatic Practice of Justice, 97
MIcH. L. REv. 1472, 1478-80 (1999).
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ones as "moral" alternatives. The rhetoric connotes that
the "legal" option is objective and integral to the profes-
sional role, while the moral option is subjective and
peripheral .... The usual effect is to make it psychologi-
cally harder for lawyers and law students to argue for the
"moral" alternative. The effect of showing that in fact both
alternatives could be understood as "legal" is thus some-
times to make the alternative positions seem more
grounded and less subjective.
131
It is important to see, however, that even in Simon's con-
struction, law remains a bounded field. Law incorporates moral-
ity, but in so doing, law transforms morality into "the materials of
conventional legal analysis." That is, by absorbing morality into
the field of law, a part of morality is transformed into law.132
Thus, ethical lawyering becomes a matter of attending conscien-
tiously to the conventional concerns of substantive and procedu-
ral justice: concerns with both the letter and spirit of the law,
concerns with procedural guarantees of fairness and accuracy in
decision-making, and so forth.
Because they place law and ordinary moral reasoning in sep-
arate fields, each of these constructions has a potentially dispir-
iting quality. The presentation of professional responsibility as a
body of self-contained legal doctrine makes Charles Fried's ques-
tion-Can a good lawyer be a good person?1 3 3 -a real and inter-
esting question. When law and morality are separate, the answer
to Fried's question is "yes, but not necessarily. '134 Practicing law
131. SIMON, supra note 60, at 102-03. David Luban's critique of Simon's
position highlights the difference between the second and third constructions
described in the text. Luban criticizes Simon's emphasis on law and legal analy-
sis in the ethical sphere, arguing that "exactly to the extent that legal reasoning
is a self-contained collection of argumentative techniques, it drifts away from
the moral emotions, one of our indispensable cognitive resources." Luban,
supra note 122, at 900. In contrast to Simon's position, Luban's argument relies
on a distinction or difference between law and morality, and a view that the
latter can be used in aid of the former. But see David Luban, Legal Ideals and
Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 255, 264-65
(1996) (arguing that many of the conflicts Simon sees in law/law terms can be
restated as morality/morality conflicts).
132. As David Luban has observed, "Simon's is a law-centered theory.
The values he wants lawyers to further are legal values; the justice he means
them to pursue is legal justice." Luban, supra note 122, at 874.
133. Fried, supra note 103, at 1060.
134. Anthony Kronman has offered an interesting response with his con-
struction of the attorney as a "lawyer-statesman." KRONMAN, supra note 94, at 11-
14 and passim. The good lawyer, in Kronman's view, is a "connoisseur" of the
law. Id. at 139. That is, the good lawyer cares "about the law's well being." Id.
Such a lawyer views a client's situation not from the perspective of the client's
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as a neutral partisan, the lawyer will sooner or later, in great or
small ways, practice local injustices toward opposing parties,
toward third parties, toward the public. How is the lawyer to
understand the moral significance of those injustices? She can
maintain an irrational faith in an invisible hand guiding those
local injustices toward the realization of a greater justice in the
long run. Or she can psychologically separate her "true self'
from the "professional self' who perpetrates injustices and, if suc-
cessful in that separation, become alienated from her work. Or
she can come to accept herself as having become an unjust per-
son. Even if she adopts the attitude of ethicists, such as Luban by
foreswearing neutral partisanship and becoming a "moral
activist," she understands herself to be reaching outside the law
to maintain fidelity to extralegal ethical considerations. What
are the psychological costs of practicing a profession that cannot
on its own terms reliably provide a moral justification for that
practice? And if she adopts Simon's point of view,' 35 she still
finds herself as a lawyer standing across a divide from those prin-
ciples of ordinary morality that have not been absorbed into law
and transformed into law.
We must remember, accordingly, that for all their differ-
ences, each of these three constructions presents professional
responsibility as a "field" of law. Their salient common feature is
that each construction more or less replicates the Langdellian
vision of law as an autonomous discipline, subdivided in turn
into relatively autonomous fields. Indeed, it is remarkable that
professional responsibility scholars on the right and the left-
from the most ardent defenders of the neutral partisanship
model to the most trenchant critics of the status quo-seem to
narrowly defined self-interest, but from a carefully balanced point of view that
considers "the good of the legal order as a whole, the good of the community
that the laws establish and affirm." Id. at 141. It would seem for Kronman, then,
that being a good lawyer is a way of being a good person and being a good
person is necessary to being a truly good lawyer. And yet Kronman curiously
and tellingly separates the demands of competence as a lawyer-statesman from
the demands of professional responsibility. He argues that a good lawyer will
sometimes advise a client to bring nuisance suits and breach contracts andjusti-
fies this by concluding that "within the bounds of what lawyers are ethically
permitted to do, cases arise in which there is a divergence between the client's
well-being and that of the law itself." Id. at 144. Once again the client's well-
being, narrowly construed, trumps, and once again morally suspect conduct is
uncontroversially seen as permitted by the relevant doctrines of professional
ethics.
135. Simon prefaces Fried's question with the following: Can "a person
who follows the Dominant View... be a good lawyer?" SIMON, supra note 60, at
17.
2001] CONSTRUCTING THE FELD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 95
accept the separateness of law, seem driven to replicate a version
of the original Langdellian vision of law."3 6
By presenting professional responsibility as a field of law,
each of these constructions places distinctively legal materials
and legal modes of reasoning at the core of the field. Other dis-
ciplines, including ethics, with their distinctive materials and
modes of reasoning, are understood to be outside of law. 37 The
differences among the three constructions reflect different rela-
tionships between law and the external disciplines-in the case
of professional responsibility, the relationship between the law of
professional responsibility and ethics. In the first construction,
which most closely resembles Langdell's original vision, law is
autonomous in the sense of being separate from other disci-
plines and rejecting the relevance of those disciplines to legal
questions. Accordingly, professional responsibility is separate
from ethics and rejects its relevance in the analysis of profes-
sional responsibility issues. In the second construction, law is
separate from other disciplines, but may borrow from those disci-
plines to supplement the legal analysis. Accordingly, profes-
sional responsibility in this construction may borrow from ethics
when the legal doctrine runs out or when it seems to yield unac-
ceptable answers to professional responsibility questions. In the
third construction, law reasserts its autonomy by colonizing other
disciplines and absorbing and transforming them into law.
Accordingly, professional responsibility absorbs a part of ethics
and makes it a part of the legal material.
This consistent treatment of law and professional responsi-
bility as bounded fields, distinguishable from ethics as a separate
bounded field, has an important consequence: it leads students,
practitioners, teachers, and scholars to ask about and puzzle over
the relationship between the practice of law and morality. This is
a question that only makes sense when law (including the law of
professional responsibility) and morality are constructed as dif-
ferent fields.
136. Clearly, the notion that law is a separate, even autonomous disci-
pline, is an idea of enormous and enduring power. Legal scholars at least since
Langdell have, with some notable exception, insisted on law's separateness,
making clear that even when law can make use of the teachings of ethics, eco-
nomics, sociology, political science, and the like, it will reach outside of the law
to borrow from those distinct disciplines. At the same time, when non-legal
scholars criticize the state of the legal profession or of legal scholarship, they
tend to accept the separateness of law. That is, they argue that legal theory and
legal practice needs supplementation from disciplines outside the law in order
to humanize, moralize, rationalize, or in some other way improve law. See gener-
ally Baron, supra note 90, at 21.
137. See id.
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But to take this question seriously is to problematize the role
of morality in the practice of law. And that consequence might
well be among the sources of much of the public's disenchant-
ment with the legal profession1 8' and of much of the alienation
from their work reported by so many practitioners. Indeed, it
seems to us a sad irony that even heroic attempts by scholars,
such as Luban and Simon to reinvigorate legal ethics paradoxi-
cally perpetuate the deep problem of separating the "legal" from
the "ethical."
Whether a different approach would improve things, we can-
not know. But suppose we constructed law in a way that does not
banish ordinary morality from consideration (the first construc-
tion) or require us to step outside the law to appeal to ordinary
morality (the second construction) or transform ordinary moral-
ity into substantive and procedural legal materials (the third con-
struction). Suppose we think about professional responsibility
not as a bounded field, but as the idea that a good lawyer must be
a good person in the ordinary understanding of that phrase.
Suppose we think that the competencies we have learned in our
lives-reasoning competencies, strategic competencies, and
moral competencies-need not be left behind when we enter the
law school as first-year law students or join a law firm. Could we
then stop asking about the relationship between ordinary ethics
and professional ethics, but just assume that they were one and
the same? Could we believe that one could not be a good lawyer
without being a good person-that being a good lawyer was just a
particular way of being a good person?
If we could do these things, would anything be different?
We do not know. In Part II we suggested how, such a construc-
tion might transform our understanding of ordinary lawyer tasks
such as framing issues and interpreting doctrine. But perhaps
instantiating ordinary ethics in the practice of law would, in the
end, still generate the familiar ideas about confidentiality and
conflict-of-interests, and loyalty, and the like. Perhaps we would
still think it proper to defeat ajust claim by raising the statute of
limitations. Perhaps the public would still distrust lawyers as
much as ever. Perhaps lawyers would still think of law as a game.
Perhaps not.
CONCLUSION
The reader who has followed us this far might be puzzled by
certain matters left unexplained. What, for example, do we
138. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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mean by "morality"? Morality has been central to the discussion,
but we have refrained from defining the term. Had we defined
morality, the definition would have implied a boundary distin-
guishing morality from what it is not, and that boundary would
have simply reproduced the very problem of "inside" and
"outside" that we have sought to identify and illuminate. Of
course, any use of the term "morality," insofar as the use is intelli-
gible, implies a definition and corresponding boundary, and our
use of the term in this essay is no exception. Suffice it to say that
we understand morality to include everything having to do with
the question of how human beings ought to be treated-by indi-
viduals, by social groups, or by the government. Such a capa-
cious understanding of morality includes matters that might be
alternatively described as "political" or "ideological" or "legal."
Accordingly, from our point of view, one virtue of our under-
standing of morality for purposes of this article is that it allowed
us (usefully, we think) to avoid those distinctions at this stage of
our inquiry.
The reader might also want to know who we think is doing
all of the "constructing" at issue in the essay. We have avoided
this question, too. For the issue of how social practices like law
are constructed is enormously complex and beside the point we
wished to make, which is about the consequences of different
constructions of law. Parts of the foregoing discussion may have
suggested a belief that individuals (such as Langdell or Luban or
Simon) can simply decide how law and its relationship to moral-
ity should be constructed. But the understanding of law that
individuals start with and the possible changes that they can envi-
sion are themselves, we believe, products of complex historical,
social, psychological, and for all we know, biological forces. We
do not believe, for example, that the law school construction of
law, notwithstanding its association with Langdell, was the prod-
uct of one man's mind or of a conspiracy between law school
faculties and the organized bar. Indeed, an important part of
our concern in this essay has been the enormous power of a well
entrenched construction of professional responsibility to chan-
nel even the most imaginative and radically intentioned thinking
in the field to replicate the entrenched construction. In any
event, it was not our objective in this essay to even begin to
unpack the forces generating the dominant construction or any
other construction of law or of the particular field of professional
responsibility.
Finally, the reader might ask at this point, "Well, what are
you proposing?" In a narrow sense, as we noted in the Introduc-
tion, we are not proposing anything. Our immediate goal in this
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essay is not to reorient the field of professional responsibility. It
is, rather, to observe how the field is currently constructed and
identify some of the implications of that construction. In that
regard, we think it important to note explicitly the extent to
which the field of professional responsibility, as currently con-
structed, displays an openness to (if not a longing for) the possi-
bility of minimizing responsibility.
But as we also noted in the Introduction, we do not claim to
be neutral on the question of constructing the field of profes-
sional responsibility. We have not focused on this issue out of
idle curiosity. We believe that the different constructions of law
and professional responsibility have important consequences.
Among those consequences is this: for people who care about
morality, any human activity that affects the well-being of other
human beings-and that includes the practice of law-will have
weighty moral significance. What morality specifically requires is
always subject to debate, and so what morality specifically
requires of lawyers will be subject to debate. Our point is a
broader one: for people who care about morality, the hegemony
of a construction of law and professional responsibility that sepa-
rates law from morality and separates the field of professional
responsibility from ethics will generate a deep dissonance. If
they are members of the general public who both seek and judge
the conduct of lawyers, their attitude toward the legal profession
is likely to be ambivalent; if they are members of that profession,
they are likely to experience alienation.
We care about how the public views our profession, and we
care about the well-being of our students and professional col-
leagues. Most importantly, like the myriad lawyers, scholars,
teachers, and students who have wrestled with the meaning of
professional responsibility, we care about morality. And we reject
the dominant construction of professional responsibility.
Because of its hegemony in the field, we doubt that at this time
any true alternative to that construction can take hold. What is
needed at this moment is incisive and relentless critique.
Accordingly, we believe that a construction of professional
responsibility that encourages a flight from responsibility should
be continuously challenged, that the borders erected by that con-
struction between professional responsibility and ethics should
be continuously assaulted, and that the hegemony of the domi-
nant construction should be continuously subverted.
